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Abstract 
The present study experimentally investigated the effects of recalling romantic relationship 
memories on forecasts for future romantic relationships for people of different attachment 
orientations. I assessed 133 college students not in a romantic relationship at the time of the 
study for their attachment group membership and asked them to recall and write about either 
their most vivid positive or negative romantic relationship memory. I measured the effects of 
recalling the memory on mood and asked participants to make a series of predictions, or 
forecasts, concerning the quality of an imagined future relationship in which they were a part. 
I expected secure individuals’ lack of defensive processing would lead to mood changes 
congruent with the valence of the memory they recalled, but that their stable positive 
relationship attributions would result in uniformly positive forecasts. I expected dismissive 
individuals to be emotionally indifferent to their memories and consistently negative in their 
forecasts. Finally, I hypothesized that preoccupied individuals’ hypervigilance to relationship 
information would lead to memory-congruent mood changes that would carry over to 
differentiate the quality of their forecasts. I generally found support for my hypotheses. 
Secure individuals’ mood changes differed dependent on the memory they recalled, but their 
positive forecasts did not. Memory valence did not change or differentiate dismissive 
individuals’ mood, but memories unexpectedly did affect the quality of dismissive 
individuals’ forecasts. Preoccupied individuals, finally, did experience mood changes as 
expected, and their forecasts generally changed congruent with the valence of the memory 
they recalled. Overall, secure individuals’ forecasts of an imagined future relationship were 
more positive than their insecure counterparts’. 
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Romantic Relationship Memory Effects on Future Romantic Relationship Forecasts: 
Differences by Attachment 
It is a central tenet of attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980) that past 
relationship experiences guide those of future relationships. Indeed, the body of attachment 
research thus far supports this contention, revealing connections between individuals’ earlier 
attachment and current relationship characteristics (Fraley, 2002; Waters, Weinfield, & 
Hamilton, 2000). However, we understand little of the mechanisms behind these patterns, 
particularly in the realm of romantic relationships (Furman & Winkles, 2011). Although 
styles of attachment reliably predict the experiences of individuals in romantic relationships 
(e.g., Feeney & Noller, 1990; Heffernan, Fraley, Vicary, & Brumbaugh, 2012; Simpson, 
1990), we still do not fully understand by what means these patterns are perpetuated. One 
possibility is that attachment shapes the autobiographical memories individuals carry from 
earlier relationship experiences (Feeney & Cassidy, 2003; Philippe, Koestner, & Lekes, 
2013; Simpson, Rholes, & Winterheld, 2010), and that these memories color expectations 
and beliefs about new relationships, affecting behavior (Downey, Freitas, Michaelis, & 
Khouri, 1998; Schacter & Addis, 2007).  
The present study experimentally investigates the effects of emotional memories from 
past romantic relationships on mood and predictions, or forecasts, about future relationships, 
and whether these effects differ depending on predominant attachment style. Examining how 
individuals of different attachment orientations forecast future romantic relationships and 
how those forecasts are affected by an arousing relationship memory can inform how 
attachment and autobiographical memories interact to inform relationship functioning.
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Broadly, this study will shed light on cognitive and emotional mechanisms underlying 
attachment-related differences in romantic relationships. 
Attachment Theory and Romantic Relationships 
One way to conceptualize romantic relationships is as an attachment process. 
Attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980) is an evolutionary, ethological model of 
human relationships originally designed to explain and predict mother-child interactions. 
Attachment theory postulates that a human’s first relationships (most pertinently with a 
primary caregiver, often the mother; Ainsworth, 1979) lay the framework for social 
interactions, and this framework reverberates throughout a lifetime. In adulthood, attachment 
anxiety and avoidance (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991) commonly conceptualizes patterns 
of attachment, where the co-occurring degree of each dimension denotes an individual’s 
classification. High attachment anxiety suggests fears of rejection and abandonment manifest 
as excessive worry over a partner’s availability and attention. Low attachment anxiety, in 
contrast, indicates more confidence in the beneficence of a partner’s intentions and 
responsiveness. High ratings of attachment avoidance imply preference for independence and 
discomfort with closeness, while low attachment avoidance suggests comfort with intimacy 
and relational interdependence. Secure individuals are low in both attachment anxiety and 
avoidance. Dismissive individuals are high in avoidance and low in anxiety, and those high 
in anxiety and low in avoidance are preoccupied.1  
                                                          
1 A fourth attachment orientation, fearful attachment, denotes individuals high in levels of anxiety and 
avoidance simultaneously. However, I will not discuss or investigate fearful attachment in this study because of 
the frequently opposing emotional, cognitive, and behavioral patterns typical of high avoidance and high 
anxiety (detailed above and below). The theoretical (and, indeed, practical; Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991; 
Shaver & Mikulincer, 2002) incoherence of fearful attachment make the prototype unpredictable in the context 
of this study and a three-prototype approach has precedence (Hazan & Shaver, 1987).  
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Notably, an individual’s attachment prototype is associated with romantic relationship 
quality and satisfaction (Simpson, 1990; see Mikulincer & Shaver, 2010, for a review). 
Attachment security positively correlates with relationship satisfaction, and insecure 
attachment (high anxiety and/or avoidance) is linked to relatively less relationship 
satisfaction (J. Feeney, 2008). Further, secure attachment positively correlates with trust, 
interdependence, and commitment. Secure individuals also experience greater intimacy and 
stability in their relationships. Anxiety, however, negatively relates with trust, and 
preoccupied individuals experience higher incidence of jealousy, conflict, and negative 
emotions. Attachment avoidance is also associated with undesirable relationship experiences, 
being negatively associated with interdependence, intimacy, and commitment. Moreover, 
securely attached individuals are more adept at solving relational conflicts than their insecure 
counterparts, again resulting in heightened satisfaction in the relationship. Finally, 
attachment security positively correlates with the frequency of reported positive emotions 
and negatively correlates with negative emotions in romantic relationships; anxiety and 
avoidance correlate in the reverse fashion (Caperton & Goodvin, 2014; Simpson, Collins, 
Tran, & Haydon, 2007).  
Internal Working Models 
To explain how and why patterns of attachment persist within individuals, Bowlby 
(1969, 1973, 1980) developed the concept of the “internal working model.” Internal working 
models are mental representations of attachment information. Attachment events from 
infancy through adulthood inform the nature of internal working models, cumulatively 
enacting an “internal simulation” of attachment information (Bowlby, 1988, as cited in 
Bretherton & Munholland, 2008; Main, Kaplan, & Cassidy, 1985). This simulation creates a 
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default framework for close relationships that supplants the need for creating individual 
mental models for every distinct relationship.  
Secure individuals hold positive internal working models typified by comfort with 
both closeness and independence, and trust that they are accepted and loved (Hazan & 
Shaver, 1987). Further, secure individuals hold positive dispositions toward other people, 
assuming others are trustworthy, dependable, and altruistic (Collins & Read, 1990), and 
believe that their attachment figures are available and helpful to them in distressing 
situations.  
An obsession for closeness and fear of an inaccessible partner dominate the working 
models of preoccupied individuals. They harbor deep concerns that their partner does not 
reciprocate the intensity of their commitment (Hazan & Shaver, 1987). Preoccupied 
individuals also evidence low self-worth and social self-confidence. They believe that they 
have little control over their lives and find understanding others to be complex and 
challenging (Collins & Read, 1990). Preoccupied individuals also make negative attributions 
for ambiguous relational behaviors (Collins, 1996) and respond to true relational negativity 
with anger and hostility (Simpson, Rholes, & Phillips, 1996). Preoccupied individuals, 
because of their uncertainty that attachment figures will be accessible and supportive, 
intensify their efforts to manage a relationship when under duress. This hyperactivation of 
emotion and coping strategies (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003) often has the opposite effect that 
was desired. As opposed to resolution of distress, preoccupied strategies demand more from 
the attachment partner than can be expected, adding to the original source of distress.  
Finally, the dismissive working models of some individuals predispose them to 
eschew relational intimacy in favor of independence, fearing the loss of their personal 
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agency. Dismissive individuals prefer autonomy and self-sufficiency in their relationships 
and are uncomfortable with the notion of dependence (their own or their partner’s) in a 
relationship (Hazan & Shaver, 1987). Dismissive individuals, who typically maintain 
relatively high self-worth and assertiveness, find that those competencies wilt in social 
situations, especially those of an intimate nature. They generally do not consider other people 
to be trustworthy or dependable (Collins & Read, 1990).  
Implicit within the above descriptions are patterns of how individuals attend to 
attachment information. Preoccupied individuals hyperattend to attachment information for 
fear of losing their partners and dismissive individuals ignore attachment information out of 
fear of losing their independence. Although these individual characteristics are considered 
global relationship strategies (Fraley & Shaver, 2000) implemented as foundational 
relationship schemes, it is key to understand the trigger that activates the most prototypical 
attachment protocols: stress (Simpson & Rholes, 2012). The working models of stressed 
insecure individuals react defensively in the interest of protecting the self. Preoccupied 
individuals react to stressful relationship information by being hyperattentive and over-
sensitive to the source of the stress. Dismissive individuals, however, diminish the 
importance of the attachment information at the source of their stress, even neglecting its 
existence. Meanwhile, secure individuals not only are more capable at constructively coping 
with relationship stress, attachment information in general does not threaten them. For these 
reasons, secure individuals do not resort to defensive mechanisms to abate relationship 
stressors (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003; Rholes, Simpson, & Orina, 1999). These patterns have 
implications for the autobiographic memories of romantic relationships that individuals are 
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likely to hold, and for how memories that are consistent, or inconsistent, with their 
attachment working model affect them. 
 In summary, secure individuals trust in their partners, assume their partners love and 
desire them, and generally have positive mental models of relationships. Insecure individuals, 
however, work from the assumption that romantic relationships are difficult and troubling.  
Internal Working Models and Memory 
A growing body of research demonstrates that the events and stories individuals recall 
and share about their relationships reflects attachment working models. Recent research 
demonstrates that memory content and themes differ by attachment style. For example, 
Nosko, Tieu, Lawford, and Pratt (2011) found in a longitudinal study that the themes 
described in participants’ “relationship defining” memory narratives had predictable 
attachment correlates. Dismissive and preoccupied individuals were more likely to tell stories 
about a relationship breaking-up than were secure individuals, who most frequently recalled 
stories of “true love.” Dismissive individuals were most likely to tell stories of independence 
in their past relationships. Further, highly avoidant individuals also have the most difficulty 
recalling their own (Mikulincer & Orbach, 1995) and others’ (Fraley & Brumbaugh, 2007) 
relationship information.  
The emotional content of memories is also subject to attachment differences. In 
general, the emotional content of an event is retained in memory (Christianson & Engleberg, 
1999) and conjured once again when the memory is activated (Collins & Allard, 2004), 
measurably altering an individual’s physiological and psychological state (Philippe, 
Koestner, Lecours, Beaulieu-Pelletier, & Bois, 2011; Schwartz, Weinberger, & Singer, 
1981). However, attachment-related individual differences in this effect exist. For example, 
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in evaluating recent emotional events, attachment anxiety and avoidance both predict lower 
levels of recalled positive emotion (Gentzler & Kerns, 2006). In addition, dismissive 
individuals also recall less negative emotional attachment information when compared to 
others (Edelstein, 2006), and their memories of either emotional valence tend to be relatively 
milder in intensity as well (Mikulincer & Orbach, 1995). Anxious individuals, on the other 
hand, recall memories of sadness, anger, and anxiety more quickly than people of other 
attachment styles do. Further, preoccupied individuals evidence greater emotionality and 
affect intensity in recalling emotional attachment events than others, even though they did 
not report greater emotionality during the original event (Pietromonaco & Barrett, 1997). 
Attachment security, in contrast, is associated with a more complete recall of emotional 
memories (Mikulincer et al., 2001; Rowe & Carnelley, 2003). Secure individuals also recall 
more positive emotions in their attachment memories, which incidentally combat negative 
affective states (Pereg & Mikulincer, 2004).  Indeed, secure individuals even recall more 
positive events from stories when primed with a rejection-oriented cue, whereas insecure 
people better recall negative events when primed with rejecting or supporting stimuli (Miller 
& Noirot, 1999). That is, despite being primed for thoughts of rejection, secure individuals 
still recall more positive events, while their insecure counterparts recall more negative 
events, regardless of primed mindset. 
In summary, secure individuals’ memories tend to be overall more positive in nature, 
leading to greater psychological resiliency in stressful situations (Philippe, Lecours, 
Beaulieu-Pelletier, 2009). In contrast, preoccupied and dismissive individuals report more 
negative emotion and negative events in their memories. Further, while preoccupied 
individuals are likely to recall negative valence memories quickly and with high intensity, the 
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memories of dismissive individuals are less complete and coherent in areas of attachment 
information and relational emotion. These patterns are largely consistent with proposals 
regarding attachment and attention to relationship salient information, described above.  
Internal Working Models and Forecasts 
Key to Bowlby’s conception of internal working models (Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980) 
is their purported predictive function. In addition to providing robust conditional guidelines 
for memory protocols and interactions in the present (Simpson & Rholes, 2012), internal 
working models should anticipate the nature of future interactions. In other words, 
attachment theory posits that internal working models organize dispositional outlooks and 
specific predictions of future relationships, dependent on the course and character of past 
relationships. This facet of attachment theory predicts that experiences from past 
relationships should inform cognitions concerning future relationships in a thematically 
coherent manner. For example, if an individual has only known abusive romantic 
relationships in the past, attachment theory would predict that the individual would expect 
abuse in subsequent relationships. The same would hold true for an individual who has only 
known supportive and loving relationships. The effects of experiences do not stop with 
forecasts, however. Indeed, Bowlby posited that outlook would actualize in a sort of self-
fulfilling prophesy (Holmes, 1993). That is, he predicted that expectations about the future 
would mediate links between past events and future behavior. If an individual believes that 
relationships operate in a certain fashion (because of remembered past experiences), those 
predictions would likely become manifest (Downey, Freitas, Michaelis, & Khouri, 1998). 
This line of thinking is not novel to attachment theory – Piagetian schemas (Piaget, 1928), 
behavioral scripts (Anderson, 1983), mental simulations in cognitive neuroscience (Adolphs, 
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2006; Gallese 2005), and comparable ideas in other areas (e.g., Abelson, 1981; Bluck, 2003; 
Pillemer, 2003; Ross, 1989; Schacter et al., 2012) all predict similar patterns.  
Several studies have found support for this aspect of internal working models in the 
context of romantic relationships. Collins (1996) found that preoccupied and dismissive 
individuals have more negative explanations of hypothetical relationship events than secure 
individuals do. Dismissive individuals, despite their negative explanations, did not express 
emotional distress. Preoccupied individuals, however, experienced more emotional stress in 
response to the hypotheticals and indicated response behaviors that would likely result in 
additional conflict. This result could help explain research relating attachment anxiety 
negatively to optimism about future love relationships (Carnelley & Janoff-Bulman, 1992). 
Similarly, Mohr, Crook-Lyon, and Kolchakian (2010) also examined how current attachment 
style related to expectations about a relationship with an imagined future romantic partner. In 
response to a hypothetical situation addressing the fallout of an imagined argument with this 
fictional partner, Mohr and colleagues found that high attachment avoidance predicted that 
the participant expected to respond negatively, and that high attachment anxiety predicted 
expecting that their partner would respond negatively. Mohr and colleagues also found that 
both indices of insecurity predicted aversive communication patterns, and that avoidance 
related to predictions of lower satisfaction in the future relationship. Corroborating evidence 
for the effects of forecasts have been found outside of an attachment context as well, 
indicating that the emotional valence (Kuwabara & Pillemer, 2010) or need satisfaction 
(Philippe, Koestner, Beaulieu-Pelletier, Lecours, & Lekes, 2012) of recalled memories 
impact subsequent decisions, actions, incidence of break-up, and well-being.  
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 These results suggest that working models do function to inform affective reactions 
and cognitions about future romantic relationships. In general, the absence of attachment 
anxiety and avoidance seems to result in a relatively more positive forecast. Attachment 
avoidance, by comparison, relates to beliefs that future relationships will be less satisfying, 
while maintaining the theme of emotional detachment. Likewise, patterns observed in 
anxious working models elsewhere hold true in forecasts. Preoccupied individuals are most 
likely to assume that their partner is not trustworthy, hyperactivate their emotions, and feel 
that there is little cause for optimism concerning future relationships. Should the patterns 
predicted above come to fruition in a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy, as attachment theory 
would predict and other research suggests, forecasts could be powerful predictors of future 
relationship quality and satisfaction.  
The Present Study 
As reviewed above, attachment internal working models likely play a role in what 
memories from past relationships people experience and recall. Despite these predispositions, 
it is likely that individuals have a range of relationship experiences, and thus relationship 
memories. For example, although avoidant individuals are disproportionately likely to recall 
break-up narratives when asked to recall a romantic relationship memory, at some point they 
experienced the formation of those close relationships and their associated positive 
experiences before the break up. The question of theoretical (and practical) interest, 
therefore, is what effect deliberately recalling a positive or a negative romantic relationship 
memory has on relationship forecasts, and whether the valence of the memory differentially 
affects secure, dismissive, and preoccupied individuals. This question becomes particularly 
interesting when considering how an individual might react to being asked to reminisce in a 
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manner antithetical to their typical attachment processes. Secure individuals, for example, are 
predisposed toward recalling positive memories – what happens when they are explicitly 
asked to recall negative ones? Further, preoccupied individuals can be emotionally volatile 
and particularly negative – how would they react to being asked to recall a relationship 
memory they consider most positive? Moreover, for dismissive individuals, who belittle the 
importance of their attachment memories in general, how might asking them to recall their 
most positive or negative emotional attachment memories affect them? This study will 
examine how remembering a relationship experience that is either consistent or inconsistent 
with existing internal working models may affect expectations for future romantic 
relationships.  
The effect of recalling emotional memories on forecasts, either consistent with or 
contradictory to an individual’s internal working model, could become manifest in their 
forecasts in a number of ways. For example, recalling a positive memory might not cause the 
forecasts of secure individuals to be substantially more positive than they already were, but 
recalling a positive memory might prompt insecure, especially preoccupied, individuals to 
make relatively more positive forecasts. This is because secure individuals already have 
positive outlooks for their future romantic relationships, and so a corroborating memory 
would do little to augment that outlook. However, a preoccupied individual, with the 
combined characteristics of a more dispositional negative outlook and a tendency for 
rumination on attachment information, might experience a boost in outlook if given a 
positive romantic relationship memory to dwell upon. I would also expect that attachment 
style would predict interesting reactions to negative memories. Secure individuals might be 
relatively more resilient to effects of recalling a negative relationship experience so that it 
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does not negatively influence their relationship forecasts. This resiliency could be credited to 
their internal working models activating positive emotions and accessing attachment figures 
(Selcuk, Zayas, Gunaydin, Hazan, & Kross, 2012) to alleviate distress and organize the 
memory in the broader milieu of their attachment experiences. On the other hand, 
preoccupied individuals might be expected to ruminate on the negative memory, 
hyperactivating their affective state and subsequently coloring their more negative forecasts. 
Dismissive individuals, meanwhile, would likely shut down their affective responses in 
general, feeling less emotion overall in the interest of maintaining personal agency from the 
threatening memory. Whether this memory would have any effect on their forecasts in the 
absence of emotional response is an open question. 
The emotional state, or, mood, generated by memory is a potential mediator in this 
study. By measuring the mood of a participant following their recollection of an emotional 
memory, we can determine if mood explains connections between the recalled memory and 
subsequent forecast. These data become especially valuable when exploring the mediating 
role of mood within a single attachment style. For example, consider a scenario where mood 
and forecast scores for preoccupied individuals were memory-congruent following the recall 
of both positive and negative relationship memories. In this scenario, I could conclude that 
mood is a mechanism altering a preoccupied individual’s expectations for future romantic 
relationships, explained by hyperactivated emotions associated with preoccupied working 
models.  
It is also important to take into account the possibility that memory content may differ 
in meaningful ways by attachment style. Each attachment style would likely present different 
patterns in their memory narratives that will affect their mood and subsequent forecasts. I 
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would expect secure individuals to provide emotionally open and coherent narratives 
(George, Kaplan, & Main, 1985). Because attachment information of either emotional 
valence does not distress secure individuals, they would likely recall truly negative or 
positive events from past relationships with neither embellishment nor restriction. Like 
secure individuals, preoccupied individuals should recall highly emotional relationship 
events. However, I would also expect that their predisposition toward attending to negative 
thoughts would skew their recall, shunning positive details in favor of negative ones. Finally, 
where I might expect preoccupied individuals to be limited in their recall of positive events, 
dismissive individuals will likely eschew detail and emotionality entirely. In efforts to defuse 
their stress associated with relationship events in general, dismissive narratives may attend to 
the information at only a superficial level. For these reasons, this study will account for 
narrative emotionality, detail, and each individual’s evaluation of their memory’s positivity 
and negativity, as the content of the memories is likely to have ramifications for their 
affective state as well as their relationship forecasts. 
Research question. How do positive and negative romantic relationship memories of 
individuals of different attachment orientations affect their mood and forecasts of future 
romantic relationships? Further, what patterns of mood and relationship forecast arise when 
people are asked to recall memories that either reinforce or challenge default processes of 
their internal working models? 
Hypotheses. A broad theoretical interpretation of how people of different attachment 
orientations process emotional relationship information and their forecasts for romantic 
relationships informs my specific hypotheses. I expect secure individuals will open 
themselves to emotional vulnerability in the recall of their memories, but also expect 
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resilience to subsequent negative emotions, resulting in uniformly positive forecasts. I predict 
that dismissive individuals will not engage on an emotional level with their recalled 
memories. As a result, I expect their forecasts to be unaffected by the valence of memory 
they recall, and for those forecasts to be generally negative. In contrast, I expect congruence 
in the valence of the memory that preoccupied individuals recall and their subsequent 
forecasts. 
My hypotheses below follow a pattern. The first two hypotheses address mood 
responses to recalled memories, the second pair concern subsequent relationship forecasts, 
and the final hypothesis addresses the potential for mood to explain the relationship between 
memory recalled and forecasts. Moreover, the first and third hypotheses compare their 
respective outcomes of interest within attachment groups, and the second and fourth 
hypotheses compare outcomes directly between attachment groups. An explanation of the 
rationale informing each hypothesis (and, by association, the broader ones above) follows 
each hypothesis listing. 
Hypothesis 1: Pre- to post-memory change in mood within attachment group.  I 
expect secure and preoccupied individuals to experience memory-congruent mood changes. 
That is, I expect secure and preoccupied individuals to experience decreased state negative 
emotion and increased state positive emotion after recalling a positive memory and decreased 
positive emotion and increased negative emotion after recalling a negative relationship 
memory. I expect dismissive individuals’ mood to remain unchanged, regardless of what 
valence of memory they recall.  
Justification for Hypothesis 1. Both secure and preoccupied individuals should pay 
considerable attention to a relationship memory: secure people because of their positive 
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associations with relationship information (and, therefore, their lack of defensive processing 
heightening or suppressing their emotions)2, and preoccupied people because of their 
defensive hyperattention to relationship information. Secure and preoccupied working 
models should then activate memory-congruent emotions for the same reasons. Dismissive 
individuals will not attend to relationship information of either valence, not allowing 
processing to reach emotional depths. 
Hypothesis 2: Attachment group differences in mood responses to relationship 
memories.  After recalling a positive relationship memory, I expect that secure individuals 
will experience more positive shifts in mood than both dismissive and preoccupied 
individuals will. Further, I expect preoccupied individuals to experience more positive mood 
shifts than dismissive individuals after recalling a positive relationship memory. I do not 
expect dismissive and preoccupied individuals to differ in negative mood changes resulting 
from the positive memory condition, but expect secure individuals to experience less 
negative mood change than both insecure attachment groups. After recalling a negative 
relationship memory, I expect preoccupied individuals to experience more negative mood 
shifts than either secure or dismissive individuals, who will not differ in negative mood 
changes. I do not expect any positive mood change differences between attachment 
orientations after recalling a negative relationship memory.  
Justification for Hypothesis 2. Secure individuals tend toward positive relationship-
related emotions, and preoccupied individuals tend toward negative relationship emotions. 
Recalling working model-congruent memories for secure and preoccupied individuals should 
                                                          
2 I could argue that the positivity of secure working models will curb any negativity they might experience 
before the state can truly take hold (or, for that matter, be measured). I consider this a real possibility, but 
ultimately side with the expectation that secure individuals will truly engage with even negative material, 
allowing themselves to feel appropriately negative emotions. 
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only reinforce those emotional predispositions. Additionally, because preoccupied 
individuals hypterattend to relationship information, recalling a positive relationship memory 
should give them a positive emotion boost beyond what emotionally distancing dismissive 
individuals may experience. However, because preoccupied individuals also carry negative 
associations with relationship information, like dismissive individuals, positive relationship 
memories are unlikely to ameliorate the negative emotions of either attachment style. In 
response to a negative memory, secure individuals will appropriately attenuate positive 
emotions, bringing them down to the same level dismissive and preoccupied individuals 
occupy. 
Hypothesis 3: Memory condition effects on forecasts within attachment group. For 
secure and dismissive individuals, I do not expect forecasts to differ between memory 
conditions, although I expect secure forecasts to be generally positive and dismissive 
forecasts to be generally negative. Further, I expect preoccupied individuals’ forecasts will be 
generally negative, but more negative after recalling a negative memory than after recalling a 
positive memory.  
Justification for Hypothesis 3. Stability and coherence marks secure attachment, 
suggesting that memory valence will not be upsetting or uplifting enough to alter future 
relationship forecasts. Dismissive individuals’ tendency to eschew relationship-related 
information may neutralize the differential effects of recalling a positive or negative memory. 
Preoccupied individuals, however, hyperattend to relationship information and the 
contrasting content of recalling a positive or negative relationship memory is likely to carry 
over to forecasts, given the preoccupied tendency toward rumination. 
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Hypothesis 4: Attachment group differences in forecasts post-memory.  I expect 
securely attached individuals will have more positive forecasts than dismissive and 
preoccupied individuals regardless of what sort of memory they recall. However, I expect 
dismissive and preoccupied individuals’ forecasts to differ by memory condition. After 
recalling a positive memory, I expect preoccupied participants to have more positive 
forecasts than dismissive individuals. However, I expect preoccupied individuals to forecast 
more negatively than dismissive individuals after recalling a negative memory.  
Justification for Hypothesis 4. Secure individuals have positive attributions for 
relationship information. These attributions are robust to challenges suggesting otherwise 
because the plurality of salient positive relationship experiences automatically diminish their 
threat. Preoccupied individuals’ tendency toward fixation on attachment information suggests 
that making salient attachment thoughts of either valence would considerably change internal 
states and forecasts. However, even when ruminating on positive relationship information, 
the distressing and confusing nature of relationships do not allow for the same level of 
hopefulness found in attachment security. Dismissive individuals likewise find attachment 
information distressing, but the emotional valence of attachment information is less likely to 
affect forecasts due to automatic and defensive distancing taking place before they can 
process emotional or cognitive changes. 
Hypothesis 5: Mood as a potential explanation for links between memory and 
forecasts. I expect that mood will explain secure individual’s relationship with their forecasts 
only after recalling a positive relationship memory. I do not expect mood to explain the 
forecasts of dismissive individuals after recalling either valence of emotional memory. For 
preoccupied individuals, I expect mood will partly explain their forecasts after recalling a 
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positive memory and fully explain their relationship with forecasts after recalling a negative 
memory. 
Justification for Hypothesis 5. Secure individuals are unlikely to defensively filter the 
emotional experiences resulting from recalling emotional memories. However, because their 
stable working models are also unlikely to be affected by mood change, only the more 
positive mood resulting from recalling a positive memory would explain the indiscriminately 
positive forecasts. In contrast, dismissive individuals emotionally disentangle from 
relationship information in general, making mood an unlikely explanation for their forecasts. 
The moods of preoccupied individuals likely link to their forecasts because of their 
hyperactivating emotional tendencies. However, because of their more negative associations, 
the more negative state produced by recalling a negative relationship memory may explain 
entirely forecasts in that condition.  
Method 
Participants  
 One hundred thirty-three undergraduate students (65% women, Mage = 18.26) from 
introductory psychology classes at Western Washington University participated in this study 
in return for in-class credit. Ninety-two percent of participants identified as predominantly or 
exclusively heterosexual. This sample does not include data from 20 participants whose data 
were lost due to computer software malfunctions. I also excluded 179 participants who were 
in committed romantic relationships at the time of the study because the recall and 
forecasting tasks of this study could be confounded by their current relationship. I also 
excluded data collected from 25 single participants over 19 years of age. Cluster analyses 
indicated that older participants were qualitatively different from the younger sample in 
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personality measures, possibly because of their continued transition from adolescence to 
emerging adulthood (Arnett, 2000). 
Procedure 
 I recruited participants into the study using the WWU psychology department survey-
hosting program. Students logged on to the website and selected my study, titled “Thoughts 
on Romantic Relationships,” to participate. In the online environment, participants completed 
demographic questionnaires, completed a measure of romantic attachment, and scheduled to 
visit the on-campus lab. The program required at least a four-day gap between making an 
appointment and visiting the lab (Mdays = 9.76, SDdays = 5.15, range = 4 – 33). Once at the 
lab, research assistants randomly assigned participants to one of two experimental conditions 
and led participants to a small room with a computer. Research assistants ensured 
participants of their privacy and told them to take as much time as necessary to complete the 
computer-based experiment. 
 All participants began the lab session with a measure of their mood. Following this 
initial measure, participants received a prompt asking them to recall either their most vivid 
positive or most vivid negative (depending on condition) emotional memory from a past 
romantic relationship in which they were a part. Participants had two minutes to recall and 
think on this memory before the program automatically proceeded to a screen where 
participants could write about their chosen memory. The instructions encouraged detailed 
narratives and participants could write for as long as they desired. However, participants 
could not advance the study until ten minutes of writing time had passed.  
 After completing their narrative, participants rated how positive and negative they 
thought the memory was and took the same measure of mood with the items in a different 
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order. For the remainder of the experiment, participants imagined that they were in a future 
romantic relationship. The instructions framed the imagined relationship as being highly 
committed and set five years into the future and one year into the relationship, as 
implemented by Mohr, Crook-Lyon, and Kolchakian (2010). While imagining they are in a 
future relationship, participants provided their expectations for the qualities of that 
relationship; that is, their forecasts of what that relationship would be like.   
Measures  
 Romantic attachment. Before coming to the lab, participants completed the 
Experiences in Close Relationships Questionnaire – Revised (ECR-R, Fraley, Waller, & 
Brennan, 2000), a self-report measure of adult romantic attachment. The ECR-R has 36-
items, half of which measure attachment avoidance (α = .94) and half address attachment 
anxiety (α = .93). Attachment avoidance reflects participants’ discomfort with closeness and 
attachment anxiety reflects participants’ fear of abandonment. An example of an avoidance 
item is “I get uncomfortable when a romantic partner wants to be very close.” An example of 
an item measuring anxiety is “I find that my partner(s) don’t want to get as close as I would 
like.” All items are rated on a 7-point scale where 1 = strongly agree and 7 = strongly 
disagree.  
 Mood. Forty-five items from the PANAS-X (Watson & Clark, 1994) measured the 
mood of participants before and after their recall of an emotional romantic relationship 
memory. An item’s relevance to relationship experiences determined its inclusion, such as 
“joyful” and “ashamed”. Participants rated the extent to which they felt the indicated emotion 
at that moment on a 5-point scale, where 1 = very slightly or not at all and 5 = extremely. 
Factor analysis (see “Preliminary Analyses”) resulted in a positive mood scale and a negative 
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mood scale, both of which were reliable in both conditions, before and after participants 
recalled an emotional memory (.88 < α < .96). 
Forecasted functioning of future relationship. Participants completed a series of 
measures following the recall of their emotional memory that addressed their forecasts of 
future romantic relationships, as implemented by Collins (1996) and Mohr, Crook-Lyon, & 
Kolchakian (2010). Multiple measures addressed different aspects of attachment working 
models and relationship quality. 
Forecasted relationship satisfaction and dissolution. A two-item (e.g., “I would be 
satisfied with my relationship with my partner.”) relationship satisfaction scale (α = .76) was 
embedded within the following “forecasted communication” inventory. This version of the 
scale was adapted by Mohr, Crook-Lyon, and Kolchakian (2010) and created by Collins and 
Read (1990). Participants also indicated how likely they thought it was that their imagined 
future relationship would experience infidelity perpetrated by either the participant or the 
imagined partner and if they thought the relationship would ultimately end in a break-up. 
Forecasted communication. Participants completed three subscales of the Marital 
Communication Inventory (Bienvenu, 1970). These subscales (Schumm et al., 1983) measure 
the amount of convivial and pleasant discussion participants forecasted to have with their 
imagined future partner (five items; α = .76), the degree to which communication with their 
imagined future partner would be avoided by both parties (5 items; α = .76), and the level of 
aversive communication participants would experience in the relationship (4 items; α = .76). 
Each item is rated on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly disagree).  
Forecasted romantic attachment. A modified version of the Experiences in Close 
Relationships Questionnaire (ECR; Brennan, Clark, & Shaver, 1998) measured participants’ 
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forecasted attachment to their imagined future partner. The ECR has 36 items evenly divided 
between items addressing attachment anxiety (α = .92) and avoidance (α = .92). Items are 
rated on a 5-point Likert scale, 1 = Strongly Disagree, to 5 = Strongly Agree. Mohr, Crook-
Lyon, and Kolchakian (2010) reworded this version’s items into the future tense. An example 
of an item measuring future anxiety is “I would worry a lot about my relationships,” and an 
example item measuring future avoidance is “I would prefer not to show a partner how I feel 
deep down.”  
Hypothetical relationship scenarios. As in Mohr, Crook-Lyon, and Kolchakian 
(2010), participants imagined that “you and your partner have just had an argument about the 
amount of time that you spend together. How likely is it that your partner would be thinking 
the following thoughts?” This prompt preceded four items beginning with the words “Your 
partner thinks,” followed by “I will never have my needs met in this relationship,” “This 
relationship is not going to last for much longer,” “I feel trapped in this relationship,” and “I 
want to end this relationship.” These items were rated on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = not at all 
likely, 4 = somewhat likely, 7 = very likely). Next, participants were asked to rate on the same 
7-point Likert scale “how likely it is that you would have the following thoughts” with the 
same four items from above, only this time beginning with “You think.” Averages from both 
subscales’ items formed a measure of how negative participant forecasts are of their partner’s 
and their own thoughts about the hypothetical argument. 
Further, participants read four relationship-relevant hypothetical situations and 
provided quantitative responses (Collins, 1996). An example situation is “Your partner didn’t 
comfort you when you were feeling down.” Following each event description, participants 
indicated how likely they thought each scenario was to result in a conflict. Participants also 
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rated each of the four prompts on seven different emotions (e.g. “angry,” “sad,” “hurt”) on a 
7-point Likert scale, imagining how the event would make them feel. These responses were 
aggregated to form a measure of how distressing (Collins, 1996) each event would be (.87 < 
α < .94). 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
 Attachment security. I used the ECR-R (Fraley, Waller, & Brennan, 2000) to assess 
participants’ romantic relationship attachment. The ECR-R is typically implemented as a 
continuous measure of attachment, where each participant is scored on dimensions of 
attachment anxiety and avoidance (Fraley, Waller, & Brennan, 2000). However, using 
attachment dimensions as predictors requires univariate normality and a linear bivariate 
relation to be interpretable. I tested the univariate normality of attachment anxiety and 
avoidance with a Shapiro-Wilk test (Shapiro & Wilk, 1965) and found that, although anxiety 
did not violate assumptions of normality (W(133) = .985, p = .142), attachment avoidance did 
(W(133) = .957, p < .001). To test bivariate linearity, I used a curve estimation of the relation 
between anxiety and avoidance. Of the curves estimating the relation, the linear model 
explained the least variability between scores of anxiety and avoidance with only 3.4% of 
observed variance explained. If I used attachment avoidance as a predictor variable or used 
the two dimensions as an interaction term, their non-normality and non-linearity could result 
in erroneous results (Howell, 2010).  
 Rather than use data transformations that would change the behavior of the bivariate 
relation (Osborne, 2002), I investigated a satisfactory categorical solution in lieu of a 
continuous option. Numerous studies in the adult attachment literature use categorical 
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attachment predictors and outcomes, often labelled as attachment styles, orientations, or 
prototypes (e.g., Carnelley & Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Collins, 1996; Hazan & Shaver, 1987; 
Simpson, 1990). Further, a categorical treatment of attachment data is appropriate for 
investigating hypotheses here.  
 I elected to use cluster analysis to demarcate attachment categories for these data. I 
chose cluster analysis because it identifies groups as they naturally occur in the dataset, 
assigning each case to a cluster based on its similarity to those surrounding it. I consider this 
approach psychometrically meaningful and therefore superior to artificially splitting the data 
with median splits or defining categories based on others’ published averages. I used two-
step cluster analysis with Schwarz’s Bayesian clustering criterion and entered attachment 
anxiety and avoidance simultaneously. Cluster analysis results revealed three clusters with 
good average silhouette cohesion and separation (.5). Anxiety and avoidance were also 
relatively close in their input importance (anxiety = 1.0; avoidance = .84); that is, no one 
dimension was primarily defining the cluster profiles. Further, the identified clusters were 
theoretically coherent and readily identifiable as secure, preoccupied, and dismissive 
attachment orientations (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991). As shown in Table 1 and 
illustrated Figure 1, the secure cluster had the lowest mean scores of anxiety and avoidance 
in the sample. Further, the highest mean avoidance defined the dismissive cluster. The same 
pattern held true for the preoccupied cluster and mean anxiety scores. Bartholomew’s 
attachment prototypes include a fourth group, fearful-avoidant, which is not represented in 
the cluster profiles. High levels of anxiety in combination with high levels of avoidance 
define fearful-avoidant attachment. An examination of the scatterplot mapping attachment 
cluster profiles on anxiety and avoidance dimensions indicates that the preoccupied and 
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dismissive clusters evenly split the quadrant defined by high avoidance and high anxiety. 
Given that I have no hypotheses for fearful-avoidance, splitting the quadrant is appropriate.  
Mood factor analysis and scales. I used exploratory factor analysis to determine 
which PANAS-X items (Watson & Clark, 1994) were best suited to measure positive and 
negative mood for this sample. To do so, I subjected post-manipulation survey scores to 
principal components analysis and used a promax rotation to allow for correlated factors. I 
removed one item (“jittery”) that indicated only mediocre sampling adequacy (item KMO = 
.664). The resulting overall KMO measure of sampling adequacy was a meritorious .88, and 
all item measures of sampling adequacy were greater than .76. Nine factors emerged with 
eigenvalues greater than one, but an examination of the scree plot supported a two-factor 
solution. Additionally, the two highest-eigenvalue factors explained 48% of observed 
variance with the other seven factors only contributing a cumulative 23% of explained 
variance. I then limited the pattern matrix to load all items on two factors. One factor 
contained positive emotion items and the other contained negative emotion items. To 
differentiate the factors, I selected items into the final scales that had a factor coefficient of at 
least .7 with the expected factor and a coefficient no greater than .3 on the other factor. 
Factor loadings and item assignments are in Table 2. The resulting scales were negatively 
correlated (r = -.378, p < .01) and reliable pre- and post-manipulation in both conditions (.88 
< α < .96). 
 Forecast factor analysis and scales. I used exploratory factor analysis to aggregate 
and simplify the outcomes of the relationship forecast questionnaires. I analyzed the scored 
scales and standalone items using principal components analysis with a promax rotation. The 
resulting overall KMO was a meritorious .86, with every item measure of sampling adequacy 
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greater than .73. Although four factors emerged with eigenvalues above one, the scree plot 
and ratio of explained variance suggested a two-factor solution. The two highest-eigenvalue 
factors explained a combined 47% of observed variance after limiting the analysis to a two-
factor solution. As seen in Table 3, each scale or item except conflict resulting from partner 
wanting a night to themselves and participant infidelity had a factor coefficient of at least .58 
on the expected factor, with no factor coefficients greater than .22 on the other factor. The 
interpretation of the structure coefficients was consistent with the pattern coefficients. To 
improve factor differentiation, I did not assign the cross-loading item conflict resulting from 
partner wanting a night to himself/herself or the weak-loading item participant infidelity to 
either factor. 
 I designated one factor as the Relationship Dissatisfaction Factor (RDF) and the other 
as Partner Rejection Angst Factor (PRAF) after examining the respective scales and items 
assigned to each factor. I indicate scale assignment in Table 3. General negative outcomes 
and experiences define the imagined future relationship scales contained in the RDF, 
indicative of imagined relationship dissatisfaction. In contrast, the new PRAF scale contains 
items and scales defined by negative reactions to slights perpetrated by the participants’ 
imagined future partners. I analyzed the reliability of the RDF and PRAF scales using every 
item that contributed to the scales from which they were constructed. I found both scales to 
be highly reliable in both the positive memory recall condition (RDF α = .87; PRAF α = .96) 
and the negative memory recall condition (RDF α = .87; PRAF α = .95).  
 I computed the RDF and PRAF variables used in analyses by standardizing scales and 
standalone items, reverse-coding scales that loaded negatively onto their assigned factor, and 
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averaging the results. All subsequent analyses of forecast variable implement the RDF and 
PRAF variables in this standardized form. 
Partner Rejection Angst Factor hypotheses ramifications. The Partner Rejection 
Angst Factor (PRAF) introduces an interesting but unexpected outcome variable to this 
study. Whereas the broadness of the Relationship Dissatisfaction Factor (RDF) allows it to fit 
cleanly into my hypotheses, the PRAF is notably different. PRAF, unlike RDF, obviously 
maps onto a specific dimension of attachment, in the case of PRAF, anxiety. Given that 
anxiety levels in part define my primary predictor variables, attachment groups, I would 
expect slightly different attachment-related outcomes from forecasts of partner rejection 
angst than I would for forecasts of relationship dissatisfaction. Although I have the same 
predictions for Hypothesis 5 for PRAF as I would RDF (i.e., I think mood should similarly 
mediate PRAF ratings as they would RDF ratings.), I would expect slightly different 
attachment-related predictions for Hypotheses 3 and 4.  
Whereas I think secure individuals, relative to the overall group and both of their 
insecure counterparts, will forecast lower RDF levels (“more positive” forecasts), I do not 
expect PRAF levels to differentiate between secure and dismissive individuals. Both secure 
and dismissive individuals rate relatively low in attachment anxiety. As such, they should not 
be concerned with their partner’s rejection of them in the imagined future romantic 
relationship (i.e., more positive PRAF forecasts for secure and dismissive groups). I also 
expect preoccupied individuals to forecast higher PRAF scores than secure and dismissive 
individuals in both conditions. Preoccupied attachment hinges on the sensitivities tapped by 
the PRAF, and I expect that recalling a positive relationship memory will not be enough to 
ameliorate such a defining characteristic of preoccupied working models to the point where 
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their PRAF forecasts would not differ from those of secure or dismissive individuals’. In 
summary, I expect preoccupied individuals’ PRAF ratings to be higher than others’ in the 
positive memory condition and taken to maximum levels as the result of recalling a working 
model-arousing negative relationship memory. 
 Narrative homogeneity between attachment clusters and manipulation checks. I 
wanted to see if participants’ written narratives of a positive or negative romantic 
relationship memory differed by attachment cluster and memory condition in order to 
contextualize the primary analyses of this study. I was specifically interested to see if 
narratives differed by attachment and condition in length (i.e., word count), use of positive 
emotion words, use of negative emotion words, and participants’ own ratings of how positive 
and negative they thought their memory was. Differences in these variables between 
attachment clusters would contextualize relations between this study’s manipulation, state 
emotion, and forecasts and would be important to consider in interpreting any findings. 
Differences in these variables between memory conditions would function as a manipulation 
check. 
 Research assistants cleaned the narratives by correcting misspelled and misused (e.g., 
“there” rather than “their”) words before I entered the narratives into the Linguistic Inquiry 
and Word Count computer program (LIWC; Pennebaker, Booth, & Francis, 2001). The 
LIWC program analyzed each narrative for the overall word count and the number of 
positive and negative emotion words according to a built-in dictionary. Positive emotion 
words included “happy,” “love,” and “pretty,” while negative emotion words included 
“hate,” “afraid,” and “pissed.”  
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Analytic approach. I took a hierarchical regression approach to analyze these data. I 
performed a series of data transformations and analyses to predict word count, positive 
emotion words, negative emotion words, and participant ratings of memory positivity and 
negativity with each attachment cluster, memory condition, and the two-way interactions 
between the attachment cluster and memory condition. The following describes my treatment 
of the data and my analytical approach. I coded attachment clusters using effect codes. Effect 
coding conveys group membership using ones, zeroes, and minus ones. Focal groups receive 
either a one or zero in k – 1 vectors, while one group acts as a reference group and receives a 
minus one in each vector. Whereas dummy coding (ones for focal group, zeroes for reference 
group/s) compares a group’s mean to the mean of the reference groups (a simple effects 
parameterization), effect coding estimates the true main effects of categorical variables by 
testing the deviation of a focal group’s mean from the grand mean (Stevens, 2007; Wendorf, 
2004). When used in a regression analysis, the grand mean of the dependent variable 
becomes the intercept and the slope of the predictor is the difference between the dependent 
variable’s grand mean and the mean of the predictor (Penn State Methodology Center, 2012). 
Because the number of participants in each attachment cluster was not equal, I weighted my 
effect codes so that the focal group remained coded as 1, but the reference group was coded 
as the negative inverse of the ratio between the number of cases in the focal group to the 
number of cases in the reference group (e.g. 50 focal group secure participants / 40 reference 
group dismissive participants = 1.25 * -1 = -1.25; Newsom, 2012; UCLA Statistical 
Consulting Group, 2014). I coded two sets of vectors in order to analyze all three attachment 
clusters by changing the reference group from the first vector to a focal group in the second 
vector. As a result, I report the subsequent regression results from two regression equations. 
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However, because both equations contain the same attachment information – only different 
reference groups – the overall R2 and F statistics were the same in both. Moreover, the 
attachment group that remained a focal group in both analyses (secure) returned identical 
regression coefficients and t-test results in both regression equations.  
  Memory condition was coded so that 0 = positive memory condition and 1 = negative 
memory condition. I then centered the memory condition variable to keep the grand mean of 
the dependent variable near the intercept and to prevent potential problems arising from 
predictor multicollinearity. To create interaction terms, I multiplied each attachment cluster 
vector by memory condition to create three two-way interaction terms.  
I used hierarchical multiple regression for these analyses. In Step 1, I entered paired 
attachment vectors and the memory condition variable simultaneously. In Step 2, I added the 
interaction terms of each attachment vector with memory condition. Regression coefficients 
and bivariate correlations predicting linguistic content variables are in Table 4. Regression 
coefficients and bivariate correlations predicting participant ratings of their memory’s 
positivity and negativity are in Table 5. Means and standard deviations for all narrative 
variables are in Table 6. 
Word count. The overall regression equation predicting word count was not 
statistically significant at Step 1 or Step 2 of the regression equation, with predictors 
explaining only 3% of the observed variance in word count. In other words, the length of 
memory narratives did not differ by attachment group membership, memory condition, or by 
attachment group membership between memory conditions. 
Positive emotion words. The overall regression equation predicting positive emotion 
words was statistically significant at Step 1, with predictors explaining 27% of the variance, 
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F(3, 128) = 15.48, p < .001. The addition of Step 2 (ΔF (2, 126) = .532, p = .589), however, 
did not explain statistically more variance (ΔR2 = .006). Attachment group membership was 
not a predictor of positive emotion words in the context of the other predictors. However, 
memory condition was a negative predictor of positive word usage in the context of the other 
predictors (t(128) = -7.47, p < .001). These results indicate that, although use of positive 
emotion words did not differ by attachment group membership, participants in the positive 
memory condition used more positive emotion words in their narratives than did participants 
in the negative memory condition. 
Negative emotion words. The overall regression equation predicting negative emotion 
words was statistically significant at Step 1, with predictors explaining 31% of the variance, 
F(3, 128) = 18.82, p < .001. The addition of Step 2 (ΔF (2, 126) = .450, p = .639) did not 
explain statistically more variance (ΔR2 = .005). Attachment group membership was not a 
predictor of negative emotion word usage in the context of the other predictors, but memory 
condition was a positive predictor in the context of the other predictors (t(128) = 7.47, p < 
.001). Like with positive emotion words, usage of negative emotion words did not differ by 
attachment group membership. However, participants in the negative memory condition did 
use more negative emotion words than participants in the positive memory condition did. 
Participants’ ratings of memory positivity and negativity. Both regression equations 
predicting participant ratings of how positive (F(3, 129) = 145.80, p < .001) and negative 
(F(3, 129) = 94.32, p < .001) they considered their recalled memory to be explained 
statistically significant amounts of variance in Step 1 (memory positivity: ΔR2 = .001; 
memory negativity: ΔR2 = .004), but not in Step 23 (memory positivity: R2 = .772; memory 
                                                          
3 A note on interactions in the above regression analyses: It might be interpreted that non-significant attachment 
group-by-condition interactions indicate that a given attachment groups’ usage of, for example, positive 
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negativity: R2 = .687). Memory condition was the only statistically significant predictor in 
both equations, indicating a negative relationship with ratings of memory positivity (t(129) = 
-20.89, p < .001) and a positive relationship with ratings of negativity (t(129) = 16.63, p < 
.001). Attachment membership was not a predictor. In other words, participant attachment 
membership did not affect their ratings of how positive or negative their memory was. 
However, participants in the positive memory condition rated their memory as being more 
positive than did individuals in the negative memory condition. In turn, participants in the 
negative memory condition rated their memory as being more negative than did individuals 
in the positive memory condition 
 Within-condition mood changes. Finally, I investigated participants’ scores of 
positive and negative state emotion to determine the effectiveness of the memory conditions 
at altering mood. Using repeated-measures ANOVA, I examined the changes in state 
emotions indicating positive and negative mood from before the recall manipulation to after. 
Please see Table 7 for descriptive statistics, tests of significance, and effect sizes found in the 
positive memory condition. For the same statistics for the negative memory condition, see 
Table 8. In the positive memory condition, I found a decrease in positive mood and no 
change for negative mood from pre-manipulation to post-manipulation. In the negative 
memory condition, I found a decrease in positive mood and an increase in negative mood 
pre- to post-manipulation. I also used a one-way ANOVA to compare post-manipulation 
positive and negative mood directly between conditions. The differences in scores of positive 
                                                          
emotion words did not differ by memory condition. This interpretation would be incorrect. Because I used 
effect coding for attachment variables that centers the intercept about the grand mean of the dependent variable, 
a non-significant interaction instead indicates that the usage of positive emotion words for a given attachment 
group was no different from the whole sample’s usage of positive words between conditions. Therefore, the 
statistically significant main effects of memory condition capture each attachment group’s usage of positive 
emotion words.   
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mood did not reach between conditions (F(1, 131) = 3.18, p = .249). However, scores of 
negative mood did (F(1, 131) = 4.81, p = .030), such that participants reported higher levels 
of negative mood following recall of a negative memory than they did after recalling a 
positive memory. 
Summary and discussion of condition effectiveness. Taken together, these 
manipulation checks indicate that participants adhered to condition-specific instructions in 
their narrative writing and considered the positivity and negativity of the event they recalled 
to be congruent with the condition’s goal. However, this pattern did not directly translate into 
condition congruent changes in mood pre- to post-manipulation or post-manipulation 
differences in positive and negative mood. Participants in the negative memory condition 
collectively experienced decreased positive mood and increased negative mood, as intended 
in the study design. However, participants in the positive memory condition also experienced 
decreased positive mood and no change in negative mood. Further, scores of positive mood 
did not differ between conditions, where negative mood scores did differ between conditions. 
 The intent of each condition was to elicit congruent changes in positive and negative 
mood (e.g., increased positive mood and decreased negative mood in the positive memory 
condition). The negative memory condition exhibited this pattern in all analyses, but the 
positive memory condition did not. The greater salience of and weight given to negative life 
events when compared to positive life events (Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Taylor, 1991) may 
explain these results. If negative events and the emotions they bear are more deeply 
processed as a function of self-definition (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 
2001), it would follow that recalling these negative autobiographical events result in more 
tangible mood outcomes. However, this theory does not reconcile why positive mood 
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decreased after recalling a positive memory. I suggest two reasons for this effect. First, I 
suspect the decrease in positive mood is associated with general emotion attenuation 
resulting from recall task cognitive load (Van Dillen, Heslenfeld, & Koole, 2001). In 
concentrating on recalling and writing their narratives, participants’ focus may have 
depressed emotionality in general. In combination with the decentralized importance of 
positive memories addressed above, cognitive load may have devitalized the emotional 
experience of recalling a positive romantic relationship memory. Alternatively, perhaps 
simultaneously, decreased positive mood after recalling a positive relationship memory may 
be the result of participants becoming wistful. My participants were not in committed 
romantic relationships at the time of the experiment. Therefore, recalling a positive, 
autobiographical relationship memory could elicit feelings of yearning and nostalgia 
(Gebauer & Sedikides, 2010) for an event or relationship that is no longer a part of their lives 
(Bluck & Alea, 2002). This nostalgia could consequently undermine the positivity of the 
memory and associated positive mood.   
Primary Analyses 
 Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 1 posited how levels of positive and negative mood would 
change from before recalling an emotional relationship memory to after for people of 
different attachment groups. To investigate, I used repeated-measures ANOVAs to examine 
how state positive and negative mood changed from pre- to post-manipulation with each of 
the three attachment clusters in each memory condition. The results of these analyses are in 
Table 7 for the positive memory condition and Table 8 for the negative memory condition. 
Secure participants in the positive memory condition experienced no changes in positive or 
negative mood, contrary to expectations, but they did experience expected decreases in 
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positive mood and increases in negative mood in the negative memory condition. Both 
dismissive and preoccupied participants, in contrast, reported decreases in positive mood in 
the positive memory condition. This result aligns with hypotheses for preoccupied 
individuals, but I expected dismissive individuals to report no changes in mood. In the 
negative memory condition, preoccupied participants, like the secure participants, reported 
decreases in positive mood and increases in negative mood pre- to post-manipulation, as 
expected. Dismissive participants reported decreased positive mood in the negative memory 
condition, contrary to predictions, but aligned with hypotheses for negative mood, with no 
change in negative mood in either memory condition. 
 Hypothesis 2. My second hypothesis suggested attachment group differences in how 
recalling positive and negative relationship memories would affect mood.4 I created mood 
balance scores by subtracting each participant’s ratings of negative mood indicators from 
their ratings of positive mood to create a single variable that would holistically assess 
participant mood. To investigate, I saved the unstandardized residuals from a regression 
analysis predicting post-manipulation mood scores with pre-manipulation mood scores. I 
then used one-way ANOVAs5 to compare mood residuals between attachment groups, in 
effect comparing the shift in mood from pre- to post-manipulation between attachment 
groups. I found that, in both the positive (F(2, 60) = 2.87, p = .065, η2 = .09) and negative 
memory conditions (F(2, 67) = 1.79, p = .175, η2 = .05), overall mood did not differ by 
attachment group membership. To explore whether positive and negative mood specifically 
                                                          
4 I also compared pre-manipulation scores of positive and negative mood between attachment clusters in each 
condition. One-way ANOVAs and Tukey’s HSD follow-ups revealed only one statistically significant 
difference: secure participants reported more positive mood than dismissive participants in the negative memory 
condition (F(2, 67) = 4.32, p = .017). I consider this result in the Hypothesis 2 section within the Discussion. 
5 I used a Bonferroni correction to account for increased the increased probability of Type I error resulting from 
multiple tests, adjusting the level of significance from p = .05 to p = .013. This adjustment did not change the 
interpretation of any results, however. 
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would differ between memory conditions, I performed the same analysis using residuals from 
positive and negative mood ratings. I found that, in the positive memory condition, ratings of 
positive (F(2, 60) = 2.20, p = .119, η2 = .07) and negative (F(2, 60) = 2.43, p = .096, η2 = .08) 
mood change did not differ by attachment cluster. Additionally, I did not find attachment 
group differences for positive (F(2, 67) = .56, p = .573, η2 = .02) or negative (F(2, 60) = 2.85, 
p = .065, η2 = .08) mood changes in the negative memory condition. In other words, the 
memory conditions’ effects on mood did not differ by attachment group membership. 
 Hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 3 concerns the predictive function of attachment, memory 
condition, and the two working together in concert to predict scores of Relationship 
Dissatisfaction Factor (RDF) and Partner Rejection Factor (PRAF). To address the 
hypothesis, I took the same multiple hierarchical regression approach as I did when analyzing 
narrative variables. Additionally, I used PROCESS (Model 1; Hayes, 2013) to probe 
statistically significant interactions. PROCESS is a computation macro for SPSS that 
performs multivariate analyses and automatic probing. For interactions, the macro provides 
conditional effects that indicate the nature of the predictor’s relation to the outcome variable 
at different levels of the moderator. I entered dummy-coded attachment variables so that 1 = 
focal attachment group and 0 = other attachment groups to allow for simple effects 
parameterization (Hayes, 2013) and greater ease of interpretation. 
Predicting Relationship Dissatisfaction with attachment and memory condition. 
Regression coefficients and bivariate correlations predicting Relationship Dissatisfaction 
Factor scores (RDF) are in Table 9. The overall regression equation predicting RDF was 
statistically significant at Step 1, with predictors explaining 24% of the variance, F(3, 127) = 
13.48, p < .001. The addition of Step 2 (ΔF (2, 124) = 5.92, p = .004) explained statistically 
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more variance (ΔR2 = .066). However, memory condition was not a contributor in Step 1 
(t(126) = -1.01, p = .314). These results indicate that, considered together, attachment group 
membership and their respective interaction terms with memory condition were predictors of 
RDF, despite the valence of the memory participants recalled not affecting RDF scores alone. 
Below, I report the effects of attachment membership and their interactions with memory 
condition in predicting RDF. 
 Secure cluster. At Step 1, being in the secure cluster was a negative predictor of RDF 
in the context of the other predictors (t(126) = -5.99, p < .001). However, in Step 2, the 
interaction term of secure-by-condition was not a predictor of RDF in the context of the other 
predictors (t(124) = .163, p = .871). These results suggest that securely attached individuals 
forecasted less6 relationship dissatisfaction than what was typical for the full sample. 
Moreover, because the interaction with memory condition was not significant, these forecasts 
were not different based on whether a secure person recalled a positive relationship memory 
or a negative one. These results support my hypothesis for secure individuals. 
Dismissive cluster. The Step 1 entry of the dismissive cluster also predicted RDF in 
the context of the other predictors (t(126) = 4.72, p < .001). The association between 
dismissive attachment and RDF is positive, indicating that dismissive participants forecast 
more relationship dissatisfaction overall. The inclusion of the Step 2 interaction of 
dismissive-by-condition was also statistically significant (t(124) = -3.03, p = .003), contrary 
to expectations. The interaction between memory condition and the dismissive cluster 
indicates that the relation between dismissive attachment and RDF differed depending on the 
                                                          
6 Higher scores on the forecast variables indicate predictions of more of that negative variable. In the 
terminology used in my hypotheses, higher scores in these variables would be akin to my use of the term 
“negative” because higher scores indicate less desirable outcomes. Conversely, a more positive outcome would 
be associated with lower scores in the forecast variables. 
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participants’ memory condition assignment. To investigate, I analyzed this two-way 
interaction using PROCESS (Model 1; Hayes, 2013) as described above. I found that 
dismissive attachment had a positive conditional effect on RDF in the positive memory 
condition (t(128) = 5.24, p < .001), but not the negative memory condition (t(128) = .178, p = 
.217). Therefore, dismissive participants forecasted more relationship dissatisfaction 
following the recall of a positive memory than is typical, but did not differ from the average 
in relationship dissatisfaction forecasts after recalling a negative memory.  
Preoccupied cluster. Finally, I predicted RDF using preoccupied cluster membership 
and found that the Step 1 entry of preoccupied attachment was, unexpectedly, not a predictor 
of RDF in the context of the other predictors, t(126) = 1.60, p = .111. Overall, preoccupied 
people did not differ from the group in their relationship dissatisfaction forecasts. However, 
the Step 2 preoccupied-by-condition variable was statistically significant (t(124) = 2.81, p = 
.006). In exploring this interaction, conditional effects revealed that preoccupied individuals 
did not differ from the average RDF forecasts in the positive memory condition (t(128) = -
.865, p = .389), but preoccupied attachment did predict higher levels of RDF in the negative 
memory condition than was typical (t(128) = 2.7, p = .007). In other words, after recalling a 
positive relationship memory, preoccupied people did not forecast more or less relationship 
dissatisfaction than average. However, recalling a negative romantic relationship memory did 
cause preoccupied individuals to forecast more relationship dissatisfaction than was typical 
for the whole sample, as expected. 
Predicting Partner Rejection Angst with attachment and memory condition. I 
investigated the attachment clusters and their interactions with the memory conditions 
relations with the Partner Rejection Angst Factor (PRAF) in the same manner as I did with 
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RDF. Regression coefficients and bivariate correlations predicting PRAF are in Table 9. The 
overall regression equation predicting PRAF was statistically significant at Step 1, with 
predictors explaining 19% of the variance in PRAF, F(3, 129) = 10.30, p < .001. The 
addition of Step 2, however, (ΔF (2, 127) = .428, p = .652) did not explain statistically more 
variance (ΔR2 = .005). Moreover, memory condition was not a predictor of PRAF in Step 1 
(t(129) = .368, p = .713). These results indicate that attachment membership alone explained 
notable variation in forecasts of partner rejection angst. Recalling a positive or negative 
relationship memory, however, had no effects on participants’ PRAF ratings for a particular 
attachment group or the collective group. Because there were no statistically significant 
results in Step 2 of the models, I only report the Step 1 effects of attachment membership 
predicting PRAF. As such, the reported effects hold true whether participants recalled a 
positive memory or a negative memory. I expected the lack of an interaction with memory 
condition for secure and dismissive individuals, but not for preoccupied individuals. 
Secure cluster. Attachment security at Step 1 of the model was a negative predictor of 
PRAF in the context of the other predictors (t(129) = -3.75, p < .001), as expected. That is, 
secure people forecasted less partner rejection angst than was typical for the overall sample. 
Dismissive cluster.  Unexpectedly, membership in the dismissive cluster did not 
predict PRAF levels in the context of the other predictors of Step 1 (t(129) = -1.59, p = .113). 
In other words, dismissive people did not differ from the norm of the sample in their 
forecasts of partner rejection angst. 
Preoccupied cluster. The preoccupied attachment cluster predicted a positive relation 
with PRAF (t(129) = 5.44, p < .001). This result indicates that preoccupied participants 
forecasted, as expected, more partner rejection angst than was typical for the sample.  
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 Hypothesis 4. My fourth hypothesis concerned how the forecasts of different 
attachment groups would compare with one another.  
Differences in Relationship Dissatisfaction by attachment. To explore the RDF 
forecasts difference between attachment groups within a given memory condition, I used 
analyses of variance.7 Table 10 shows the analyzed means and standard deviations. The 
omnibus test returned as statistically significant in the positive memory condition (F(2, 58) = 
15.13, p < .001, η2 = .34), so I analyzed the differences between the attachment clusters using 
Tukey’s HSD. I found that secure and preoccupied participants did not differ in their ratings 
of RFD (p = .245), counter to my expectations. However, dismissive participants reported 
higher scores of RFD than both secure (p < .001) and preoccupied participants (p = .002), as 
expected. That is, after recalling a positive relationship memory, dismissive individuals 
forecasted more relationship dissatisfaction than did secure and preoccupied participants. 
The negative memory condition also exhibited differences in RDF scores by 
attachment cluster (F(2, 66) = 11.32, p < .001, η2 = .26). Specifically, secure participants 
reported lower RDF scores than dismissive (p = .003) and preoccupied (p < .001) 
participants, as expected. In turn, dismissive participants’ scores of RDF were did not differ 
from those of preoccupied participants (p = .618), contrary to my predictions. In other words, 
preoccupied individuals forecasted more RDF than dismissive and secure individuals after 
recalling a negative relationship memory, and secure RDF forecasts were lower still than 
dismissive participants’ forecasts. 
I also wanted to conduct a more holistic, post-hoc examination of how different 
attachment groups made forecast predictions. To investigate, I compared the slopes of each 
                                                          
7 A Bonferroni correction moved the level of significance from p = .05 to p = .013. This adjustment again did 
not change the interpretation of any results. 
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attachment group’s RDF forecasts between conditions, allowing me to contrast how memory 
condition affected each attachment groups’ forecasted RDF. To isolate the slope of RDF for 
each attachment group, I used PROCESS to find the conditional effect of memory condition 
when a dummy-coded attachment variable was equal to one. I then compared the coefficients 
and standard errors of these lines in a slopes difference test (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 
2003; Soper, 2014), using the n’s for the respective number of participants assigned to the 
pertinent attachment cluster.  
An illustration of these results is in Figure 2. I found that the secure participants’ 
slopes predicting RDF across memory conditions did not differ from those of dismissive 
(t(86) = 1.85, p = .067) or preoccupied (t(86) = 1.45, p = .151) participants. However, the 
slope of dismissive participants did differ from slopes of preoccupied participants (t(79) = 
3.09, p = .002) when predicting RDF across conditions. These results indicate that the 
relation of memory condition to relationship dissatisfaction forecasts for secure participants 
did not differ from either dismissive or preoccupied participants’ slopes. The effect of the 
memory conditions, however, did cause dismissive and preoccupied participants’ forecasts of 
relationship dissatisfaction to differ. Notably, the slope for dismissive individuals was 
negative where the slope for preoccupied individuals was positive, indicating that the 
memory conditions had inverse effects on preoccupied and dismissive participants. 
Differences in Partner Rejection Angst by attachment. I used ANOVA to investigate 
if there were differences between attachment clusters’ PRAF levels in the same memory 
condition. Please find the means and standard deviations for these analyses in Table 10. The 
omnibus test indicated that there were significant differences between the attachment clusters 
in the positive memory condition (F(2, 60) = 8.82, p < .001, η2 = .23). Investigation with 
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Tukey’s HSD revealed that preoccupied participants forecasted more PRAF than secure (p = 
.001) and dismissive participants (p = .003). Secure and dismissive participants did not differ 
in their PRAF forecasts (p = .930). In other words, although secure and dismissive 
individuals forecasted similar partner rejection angst, preoccupied individuals forecasted 
more partner rejection angst than both after recalling a positive memory, all of which 
supports my predictions. 
In the negative memory condition, PRAF scores also differed by attachment (F(2, 67) 
= 6.66, p = .002, η2 = .17). As was the relation in the positive memory condition, secure and 
dismissive participant did not differ in the forecasts of PRAF (p = .561). However, 
preoccupied participants only forecasted more PRAF than secure participants (p = .002). 
Preoccupied and dismissive individuals did not differentiate in PRAF scores (p = .057), 
although I expected they would. 
As performed with the RDF, I used the conditional effect of memory condition when 
attachment cluster variables were equal to one to elucidate the effect of each attachment style 
across conditions in predicting PRAF. Figure 3 illustrates these results. My analyses revealed 
no differences between the slopes of participants from secure, dismissive, and preoccupied 
clusters predicting PRAF across conditions. That is, secure, dismissive, and preoccupied 
people forecasted partner rejection angst in the same manner across conditions. 
Hypothesis 5. Hypothesis 5 predicted that changes in mood could explain the link 
between an attachment group’s memory and their forecasts. To test this, I again implemented 
the balance score residuals used during manipulation checks.  Balance scores are appropriate 
for determining the mediating role of mood because they are a holistic representation of a 
participants’ mood. An examination of the mediating role of only negative mood or only 
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positive mood would be low in ecological validity because the two do not exist discretely. To 
test preliminary conditions for mediation, I isolated individuals from each attachment cluster 
and computed the zero-order correlations for memory condition, mood balance residuals, and 
forecast variables. In each analysis, the correlation between the memory condition and mood 
balance score was non-significant. According to Baron and Kenny (1986), this result fails a 
necessary condition for partial and complete mediation, indicating that mood does not 
mediate the relation between memory condition and forecast variables for any of the three 
attachment groups.       
Discussion 
 I designed the present study to explore the effects of people’s past relationship 
memories on their forecasts of future romantic relationships. To investigate, I asked 
participants not currently in a romantic relationship to recall either their most vivid positive 
or negative relationship event. I measured the mood changes participants experienced after 
recalling a relationship memory and asked them to forecast details about an imaginary future 
relationship in which they are a part. I organized this study in an attachment framework, 
expecting differential results predictable by a participant’s attachment orientation.  
Broadly, I expected the data to reveal that secure individuals experience an emotional 
openness to the memory they recalled while remaining steadfast in their positive and hopeful 
anticipations of a future relationship, resilient to negative emotions and cognitions. For 
dismissive individuals, I predicted emotional indifference and distancing, followed by 
stubborn negativity in their forecasts. Finally, for preoccupied individuals, I expected 
hyperactivated state emotions would lead to congruent changes in future relationship 
forecasts, the results of fearful attention to relationship information. Below, I discuss these 
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predictions in detail. I will then discuss the results as they relate to one another in 
combination and their broader implications. Finally, I will address limitations of this study 
and make recommendations for future directions in this line of research.  
Hypotheses Discussion 
Hypothesis 1. I made a series of attachment group-specific hypotheses regarding how 
positive and negative mood would change from before recalling an emotional relationship 
memory to after. My investigation yielded mixed results concerning my hypotheses.  
Secure group. For secure individuals, I expected their lack of defensive processing 
(Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003; Rholes, Simpson, & Orina, 1999) to result in condition-
congruent mood changes. In other words, I expected secure participants to report increased 
positive mood and decreased negative mood after recalling a positive memory and decreased 
positive mood and increased negative mood after recalling a negative memory. Although I 
found support for this prediction in the negative memory condition, secure individuals’ mood 
remained unchanged after recalling a positive memory condition. I suspect recalling a 
positive relationship memory did not affect secure individuals’ positive mood because the 
task of recalling and writing about a positive memory activated cognitive resources that 
quieted mood responses. Further, positive memories from a past relationship could have 
made secure individuals wistful, removing some of the positivity from the memory. An 
attachment-specific reason for this effect could be that positive relationship memories are 
congruent with secure working models (Pereg & Mikulincer, 2004). Therefore, recalling a 
positive memory might not emotionally affect secure individuals. However, working model-
incongruent memories (i.e., negative ones, for secure individuals), in combination with the 
absence of defensive filtering, lead to memory-congruent mood changes. 
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 Dismissive group. Because of their defensive self-distancing from emotion and 
relationship information (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991; Mikulincer & Orbach, 1995; 
Fraley & Brumbaugh, 2007), I did not expect dismissive participants to respond emotionally 
to recalling either a positive or negative relationship memory. Indeed, dismissive participants 
did not report any change in negative mood resulting from the recall of either valence of 
memory. However, dismissive individuals did report decreases in positive mood in both 
memory conditions. This decrease in positive mood could be in part due to wistful feelings 
and concentration on the experimental task, but I also suspect an attachment-specific reason. 
In engaging with relationship information of either valence, I suspect that dismissive working 
models attenuated positive mood in efforts to create emotional distance from the troubling 
stimuli (Gentzler & Kerns, 2006).   
Preoccupied group. Hypervigilance to relationship information and emotional 
volatility, often marked by negative moods stemming from their insecurity, are common 
descriptors for the internal states of attachment preoccupation (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003). 
For these reasons, I expected preoccupied participants to experience increases in negative 
mood and decreases in positive mood in both conditions. I found some support for this 
prediction as well. In the negative memory condition, preoccupied participants did report 
decreases in positive mood and increases in negative mood. Preoccupied participants also 
reported decreases in positive mood in the positive memory condition, but experienced no 
change in negative mood. Although I predicted increases in positive mood after recalling a 
positive memory, this result is also unsurprising. Preoccupied individuals, despite deeply 
considering a positive event, still must overcome their dispositional negative moods 
experienced in response to relationship information. A nullification of positive mood in this 
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scenario makes sense. Further, if pining over positive memories of the past were to affect any 
attachment group, it would be the ruminative preoccupied. Because preoccupied individuals 
observe negative relationship information especially closely (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2010; 
Simpson, Collins, Tran, & Haydon, 2007), the focus of their attention might not have been on 
the positivity of the memory, but rather on the fact that the memory was from a relationship 
that (for one reason or another) ended. 
Hypothesis 2. My second hypothesis made predictions on how ratings of positive and 
negative mood shifts from before to after recalling a relationship memory would compare 
between attachment groups within a given memory condition. I expected each attachment 
group’s mood changes to compare in the same manner that their attention to relationship 
information does (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2010; Simpson & Rholes, 2012). That is, I expected 
secure individuals to report relatively more positive mood changes after recalling a positive 
relationship memory, preoccupied individuals to report relatively more negative mood 
changes after recalling a negative relationship memory, and for dismissive individuals’ 
indifference to relationship information to place them in the middle of relative positive and 
negative mood changes regardless of memory recalled. Instead, I found that participants of 
different attachment groups did not differ in how recalling a positive or negative relationship 
memory affected their mood. I suspect this result is due to the restricting structure of the 
narrative probe. I asked participants to think about their relationship memory for two minutes 
before advancing to a screen that demanded ten minutes of writing before participants could 
advance. I also had explicit instructions for engaging with and writing about their memory. I 
designed the probe with the intent of ensuring that relationship memories would be salient in 
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participants’ minds during the forecasting portion of the study, but the probe seems to have 
removed variability in attachment-dependent mood changes in the process.    
Hypothesis 3. I had specific expectations for how recalling a positive or negative 
relationship memory would affect each attachment group’s relationship forecasts. My 
hypotheses in this regard were the same for both RDF and PRAF forecasts, with one 
exception: Although I expected the dismissive group to predict generally higher levels of 
RDF than was typical, I expected them to predict generally lower levels of PRAF than was 
typical. Below, I discuss the results for both forecast variables as they related to each 
attachment group. 
Secure group. For both PRAF and RDF, membership in the secure group forecasted 
lower levels than average when controlling for memory condition. Moreover, this effect 
remained constant regardless of whether secure individuals recalled a positive or negative 
relationship memory. These results support my hypotheses for secure individuals. I suspect 
these results are explainable by the robust and generally positive working models typical of 
attachment security. If secure individuals’ default cognitions concerning relationship 
information are positive, it follows that their forecasts would remain stable between 
conditions: the positive memory is congruent with how they typically think, and their 
overwhelming positivity contextualizes the negative memory, diminishing differential effects 
in forecasts. 
Dismissive group. The results for dismissive individuals did not uniformly support 
my predictions. I expected that dismissive group membership would forecast higher levels of 
RDF because of dismissive individuals’ generally negative assessment of relationships. 
However, I expected that dismissive individuals’ relatively low attachment anxiety (i.e., low 
  48 
fears of rejection) would forecast lower levels of PRAF than average. Although I found 
support for hypothesis regarding RDF forecasts, I found that dismissive group membership 
was not a predictor of PRAF ratings. I believe attachment avoidance and the generally 
negative working models of romantic relationships dismissive individuals carry can explain 
this result. Although dismissive individuals’ relatively low anxiety scores would suggest 
definitively low PRAF levels, the nature of their insecurity – preference for self-agency 
preservation – conflates with the positive outcomes of low anxiety to create an incoherent 
prediction. That is, although dismissive individuals are not particularly concerned with a lack 
of attention from their imagined future partner, they do not expect good outcomes from their 
interactions in general.  
I also found the dismissive group difficult to predict concerning how their forecasts 
would differ between conditions. I expected that, with both forecast variables, dismissive 
indifference to the experimental stimulus would result in stable forecasts across conditions. 
Dismissive individuals’ ratings of PRAF supported this hypothesis, but their RDF forecasts 
did not meet expectations. Instead, dismissive participants forecasted more relationship 
dissatisfaction after recalling a positive memory than they did after recalling a negative 
memory. The first meaningful revelation of this result is that it suggests dismissive 
individuals engaged in the experimental task more than I expected. Foundational to my 
prediction for dismissive individuals was the assumption that their defensive processing 
would remove them from meaningful cooperation with the manipulation. However, 
dismissive individuals’ RDF forecasts differed between conditions, indicating immersion in 
the stimuli. It is further notable that the interaction stemmed from dismissive RDF ratings in 
the positive memory condition. Considering dismissive individual’s engagement in the study 
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and their reactivity to recalling a positive relationship memory in combination, a possible 
explanation for this interaction could arise from the working model-incongruent nature of 
recalling a positive relationship memory. Dismissive individuals, by definition, do not 
engage in careful consideration of their past romantic relationship experiences. Doing so for 
a positive relationship memory is likely rarer still. It could be that the novelty of engaging in 
this exercise is unnerving, even threatening. Thinking of relationships in a positive light may 
in turn activate their attachment systems and their negative attributions of their imagined 
future partner. Meanwhile, the negative memory condition, although still requiring greater 
attention to relationship information than typical, is at least in-line with the typical valance of 
their disposition toward relationships. 
Preoccupied group. Like the dismissive group, I found both support and opposition 
for my hypotheses concerning preoccupied individuals. I expected preoccupied individuals to 
forecast higher levels of both RDF and PRAF than the sample’s average. I reasoned that 
preoccupied working models, defined by fearful hypervigilance and negative relationship 
attributions, would make generally negative forecasts for future relationships. Indeed, 
preoccupied individuals did forecast higher levels of PRAF than was typical. Given the 
centrality of partner rejection angst to preoccupied attachment, this was not surprising. 
However, I did not find that preoccupied forecasts of RDF differed from the average. I 
suspect membership in the preoccupied group was not a significant RDF predictor because of 
response volatility within the group. It is possible that, when controlling for condition in the 
regression model, preoccupied individuals did not provide coherent RDF forecasts precisely 
because memory condition affected their outlook in different directions. 
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I expected preoccupied individuals would rate RDF and PRAF in alignment with the 
valence of the memory they just recalled. I reasoned that preoccupied individuals’ tendency 
toward hypervigilance and rumination with relationship information would result in 
correspondingly more optimistic or grim forecasts, relative to the valence of memory 
recalled. As expected, RDF forecasts did differ between conditions. However, it is 
noteworthy that the negative memory condition was the source of the interaction. That is, 
preoccupied individuals in the positive memory condition did not vary from the typical; 
instead, those in the negative memory condition were deviant from the average. This effect is 
likely the result of negative relationship information threatening preoccupied working models 
(Simpson, Rholes, & Phillips, 1996). Because relationships are a central, obsessive concern 
of preoccupied individuals, engaging in an exercise requiring personal and negative 
relationship memories is likely to activate their attachment working models. Considering 
preoccupied working models engage feelings of distrust and negative attributions, 
preoccupied RDF forecasts were more negative after recalling a painful memory than after 
recalling a non-threatening memory. 
Although I expected PRAF ratings to differ between memory conditions in the same 
manner as RDF ratings, I did not find support for this hypothesis. I suspect this stability is the 
result of ceiling effects and demonstrative of the strength between preoccupied attachment 
and a forecast variable so closely resembling their core sensitivities. Fear of partner rejection 
angst is a definitive function of activated preoccupied working models. Memory valence was 
likely not strong enough to alter the centrality of this construct’s effects as it was in RDF 
predictions. 
  51 
Hypothesis 4. I expected to find within-condition differences in RDF and PRAF 
ratings between attachment groups. 
Relationship Dissatisfaction. In the positive memory condition, I expected that the 
robust positivity of secure individuals would lead to lower RDF scores than both insecure 
groups. Further, I expected preoccupied individuals to lower RDF scores than dismissive 
individuals because of presentation of positive relationship information available for 
impressionable preoccupied individuals to consider.  I found partial support for this 
hypothesis. I found that being in the dismissive group predicted higher RDF levels than 
secure and preoccupied groups did. Secure and preoccupied RDF forecasts did not differ. I 
expected that the positive working models of secure individuals would lead to more positive 
RDF forecasts than preoccupied individuals. Despite my expectations that preoccupied 
individuals’ outlook positivity would increase from recalling a positive relationship memory, 
I still expected their foundationally negative relationship associations consequential enough 
to cause forecast discrepancy with indomitably positive secure individuals’. Instead, it seems 
that recalling a positive relationship memory allowed preoccupied individuals to forecast low 
RDF to the same degree as their secure counterparts. This result suggests that preoccupied 
individuals may use their own ruminative nature to their advantage. Clinging to positive 
relationship memories seems to alleviate their insecurity, reinforcing positive associations 
with romantic relationships and assumptions that future satisfaction is a likely outcome. Of 
course, I did not test the longevity and efficacy of this effect here. 
Following recall of a negative relationship memory, I still expected secure individuals 
would predict more positive RDF forecasts than their insecure counterparts would. However, 
I hypothesized that recalling a negative relationship memory would activate preoccupied 
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working models and enhance their inherent negativity, resulting in their forecasts being more 
negative than dismissive individuals’. I found partial support for these hypotheses. Although 
secure individuals’ relationship dissatisfaction forecasts were lower than both insecure 
groups, preoccupied and dismissive group forecasts did not differentiate. I suspected that 
making salient a negative relationship memory would lead to activation of preoccupied 
individuals’ attachment working models, defined by negative relationship assessments. 
Although Hypothesis 3 results indicated this to be true, I expected this effect would be 
dramatic enough to differentiate their negative memory condition forecasts from dismissive 
individuals’. However, this result is not wholly surprising. Dismissive individuals also 
maintain negative sentiments toward romantic relationships. Further, even though their post-
positive memory relationship dissatisfaction forecasts were uniquely high, attending to 
relationship information – even if working model-congruent – would not put dismissive 
individuals at ease. I suspect the exercise of engaging in any relationship memory was 
troubling for dismissive individuals, removing the possibility for unaroused dismissive 
forecasts. For the singularly positive relationship dissatisfaction forecasts of secure 
individuals, I suggest these results are indicative of the indomitable positivity of their 
working models. That is, I think secure individuals’ categorically favorable appraisal of 
relationships annulled the outlying negativity of their memory in this condition.  
Partner Rejection Angst. I expected that secure and dismissive individuals would 
predict lower PRAF scores than preoccupied individuals would. Unlike predictions of RDF, I 
thought the centrality of PRAF to attachment preoccupation would neutralize any 
considerable alleviation of PRAF fears by recalling a positive relationship memory. Because 
of their shared low anxiety scores, I did not expect forecast differences between secure and 
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dismissive individuals. I found full support for my hypotheses in this condition. Once again, 
these results indicate secure individuals’ positive attributions for their partners and 
preoccupied individuals’ fear of rejection, even following a positive memory prime.  
I expected the same pattern of relation between the attachment groups in the negative 
memory condition as I did the positive memory condition. I thought the memory conditions 
would not be enough to alter forecasts, given the entrenchment of the concept of partner 
rejection angst in attachment orientations. However, dismissive individuals’ PRAF scores did 
not differ from those of either secure or preoccupied individuals’, contrary to my predictions 
that dismissive and preoccupied PRAF projections would continue to differentiate. In 
interpreting why preoccupied and dismissive PRAF forecasts did not differ, it is important to 
recall that membership in the dismissive group was not a significant predictor of PRAF. I 
would again suggest that dismissive indifference toward partner attentions, in combination 
with the extreme differentiation between secure and preoccupied individuals, led to 
incoherent dismissive PRAF forecasts, situated in the middle. However, I found support for 
my expectations in that preoccupied individuals forecasted higher levels of PRAF than secure 
individuals did after recalling a negative relationship memory.  
Hypothesis 5. I expected that participants’ changes in mood would explain the links 
between the memory conditions and forecast variables. However, no memory condition 
within any group of attachment membership predicted positive-negative mood balance 
scores. These results suggest that mood does not explain the link between a recalled 
emotional memory and the quality of forecast. I expected mood shifts for both secure and 
preoccupied individuals would be at least partially explain the relationship between memory 
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recall and forecasts. I will discuss these findings with detail in the General Discussion 
section, as these results are emblematic of broader themes concerning this study.   
General Discussion 
 As addressed above, I framed the present study using attachment theory and 
investigated the effects of recalling emotional relationship memories on mood and forecasts 
of an imagined future relationship. I found partial support for my hypotheses, but also some 
surprising findings, which I will discuss in concert. 
 For secure individuals, I expected to find condition-congruent mood reactions that, 
even when negative, predicted positive forecasts of a future imagined relationship. This 
prediction was somewhat supported. Indeed, for both forecast variables, Relationship 
Dissatisfaction and Partner Rejection Angst, secure individuals reported relatively low levels 
that were stable between conditions. This was despite condition-congruent changes in mood 
that secure individuals experienced in the negative memory condition. However, secure 
individuals experienced no mood changes in the positive memory condition, perhaps as a 
function of the banality of positive relationship information to secure working models. It is 
notable, however, that secure individuals were the only attachment group who did not 
experience decreases in positive mood after recalling a positive relationship memory. I think 
there are two attachment-related reasons for this. If mournful nostalgia were a reason for 
insecure individuals’ decreased positive mood, this result could indicate that secure 
individuals were more resilient to wistful reminiscence of their past relationship than others 
were. Perhaps secure individuals were able to contextualize their lost relationship better than 
insecure individuals could, resulting in relatively greater appreciation for the positivity of 
their chosen memory. Overall, I conclude that there was support for my general assumptions 
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concerning attachment security: the overall picture is one of adaptive stability and positive 
outlook. 
 I expected emotional indifference and broadly negative forecasts of future 
relationships to mark dismissive individuals’ experience. This too was largely supported, but 
with notable exceptions. Regarding mood, dismissive individuals reported no change in 
negative mood in both conditions, but also attenuated positive mood regardless of condition. 
What is most interesting is the difference in RDF scores following dismissive individuals 
recalling a positive versus a negative memory. There, the incongruent content of the positive 
relationship memory to dismissive working models led to the highest forecasted relationship 
dissatisfaction among all attachment groups in both conditions. One potential implication is 
that it may be adaptive for dismissive individuals to incrementally expose themselves to 
positive relationship thoughts. This process may acclimate dismissive individuals to thinking 
of relationships in a positive manner, defusing the likelihood of their attachment working 
models responding negatively to the incongruent stimuli. Otherwise, new, positive 
relationship information might not be allowed to integrate into their working models because 
their current working models respond so negatively. Although membership in the dismissive 
group was not a significant predictor of PRAF (discussed above), the type of memory they 
recalled obviously affected this group, as evidenced by their RDF responses between 
conditions.  
 Hyperattention to relationship information and volatility in relational attributions 
defines preoccupied individuals. As a result, I expected preoccupied individuals to 
experience condition-congruent mood changes, as I did for secure individuals. However, 
unlike secure individuals, I expected preoccupied individuals would allow their 
  56 
impressionable moods to affect their forecasts of a future romantic relationship. I again found 
partial support for this overarching expectation. After recalling a negative memory, 
preoccupied individuals did experience condition-congruent mood changes, as expected. 
However, recalling a positive relationship memory led to decreases in positive mood and no 
change in negative mood. Despite the incongruent mood changes (or lack of change at all) in 
the positive memory condition, RDF forecasts were condition-congruent. That is, 
preoccupied individuals forecasted more relationship dissatisfaction after recalling a negative 
memory than they did after recalling a positive memory. This result suggests that, for 
preoccupied individuals, focusing their ruminations on positive relationship information 
might lead to forecasts that are more positive and, potentially, more positive relationship 
experiences. Partner rejection angst ratings, in contrast, did not differ between conditions but 
were generally higher than those of secure and dismissive individuals. 
 Considering the results together, pervasive themes arise. One notable theme is the 
discrepancy of the accuracy of my predictions between the positive and negative memory 
conditions. With few exceptions, my expectations for attachment-predicted mood and 
forecast scores were coherent in the negative memory condition. In contrast, I found less 
frequent support for my hypotheses for mood and forecasts following recall of a positive 
relationship memory. I believe this trend occurred for a number of reasons. First, it is 
possible that participants became wistful or pensive after recalling a positive memory from a 
relationship they were no longer in. This could explain the occasionally unexpected mood 
changes observed in the positive memory condition: the memory could simply not be wholly 
positive, in context. Secondly, I think the difficult predictability of the positive memory 
condition outcomes could harken back to the generally lower importance and salience of 
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positive emotions and events. Isolating the underlying causes of some of my results in the 
positive memory condition is more difficult if positivity is not impactful as it allows for 
greater possibility that other, unquantified variables were in effect. Finally, I think that the 
trend of unsupported hypotheses in the positive memory condition could be indicative of the 
foundationally negative framing of adult attachment. Attachment researchers do not define 
attachment security by the presence of adaptive and healthy relationship thoughts, moods, 
and behaviors, but rather by the absence of maladaptive and unhealthy ones. This orientation 
is important as it focuses on how individuals reckon with stressful relationship information, 
but it may nonetheless lead to the clearest elucidation of predictions when framed in negative 
contexts.   
Another noteworthy theme concerns the inconsistent and somewhat incoherent role of 
state emotion and the revelation that mood does not mediate the relationship between 
memory recalled and forecast for any attachment group. Because there were differences 
between conditions for forecasts not reconciled by mood, I take this to mean that other 
constructs unmeasured in this study informed participant forecasts. Perhaps measures of state 
general anxiety (Mohr, Crook-Lyon, & Kolchakian, 2010), stress (Simpson & Rholes, 2012), 
or vividness of the recalled memory (Gaesser & Schacter, 2014) would explain the link 
between memory valence and forecasts more clearly. However, recalling a positive or 
negative relationship memory may not need a mediator. It may be that engaging in the recall 
exercise activates internal working models informing forecasts on their own, perhaps by 
virtue of shared brain structures (Gaesser et al., 2013), without a meaningful or observable 
mediator.  
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I also find it noteworthy, even surprising, that the quantitative aspects of memory 
narratives did not differ by attachment. Although I designed the memory probe to be 
maximally affective, with little room for variation (e.g., explicit instructions on the valence 
of memory recalled, forced time to consider a memory, a minimum amount of time spent 
writing about the memory), prior research suggests that narratives would present attachment-
based differences (Edelstein, 2006; Gentzler & Kerns, 2006; Mikulincer & Orbach, 1995; 
Pietromonaco & Barrett, 1997). However, attachment group membership did not predict 
differences in narrative length, usage of positive or negative words, or participants’ own 
ratings of their memory’s positivity and negativity. Perhaps qualitative analyses of narrative 
themes (Nosko, Tieu, Lawford, & Pratt) would elucidate attachment-related differences, but 
it may simply be the case that the narrative probe was even stricter than I hoped. 
Limitations 
Readers should consider several limitations when assessing the importance of my 
findings. First, the relatively low number of individuals participating in this experiment left 
my study statistically underpowered. With a larger sample size, I suspect that some of my 
more ambiguous or unexpected findings would have been clarified. Indeed, many of my 
unsupported hypotheses were not the result of unexpected significant results, but rather non-
significant results. 
 Additionally, I think it is worth noting that, although defensible for my questions and 
data, a categorical treatment of adult attachment orientations is not ideal. As with any 
categorical approach, attachment classification reduces measurement precision and power. 
Although most modern attachment research considers attachment as a continuous variable, 
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discussions on the topic are ongoing (Fraley & Roisman, 2014; Fraley & Spieker, 2003; 
Roisman, Fraley, & Belsky, 2007).  
 Methodologically, I recommend a repeated measures approach to collecting forecast 
data in related future studies. By only measuring participants’ data following implementation 
of the stimulus materials, I could not isolate the effects of the stimulus. Instead, measuring 
forecasts before (perhaps discreetly) and after the manipulation would account for all of the 
extraneous variables a participant brings into the lab, increasing internal validity. Further, 
this study could have benefited from having some manner of control condition or conditions. 
In my study, I cannot entirely attribute the effects to the fact that memories were emotional, 
or that they concerned an autobiographical relationship memory. Conditions with non-
emotional and non-relationship-related probes might further contextualize findings. I also 
believe that an alternative statistical approach to analyzing mood as a mediator between 
memory valence and forecast could yield interesting results. Instead of the traditional Baron 
and Kenny (1986) approach to mediation, these data could be analyzed using multilevel 
structural equation modeling (MSEM) as outlined by Preacher, 2011. 
Conclusion 
 This study reveals patterns supporting the hypothesis that forecasts for future 
relationships differentiate by attachment style and, to a lesser degree, are susceptible to the 
influences of recalling an emotionally powerful romantic relationship memory. No other 
research to my knowledge investigates memory as an antecedent of romantic relationship 
forecasts, and none does so in an attachment framework, either.  
In general, my results align with adult attachment theory (e.g., Hazan & Shaver, 
1987; Simpson, 1990) and previous work independently investigating attachment’s role in 
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memory (e.g., Mikulincer & Orbach, 1995; Philippe, Lecours, Beaulieu-Pelletier, 2009) and 
forecasts (Carnelley & Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Collins, 1996; Mohr, Crook-Lyon, & 
Kolchakian, 2010). However, this work does not examine the veracity of participants’ 
relationship forecasts, nor does it measure the power which recalling an emotional 
relationship memory influences behavior in a real world setting. Attachment theory proposes 
that internal working models and the styles that define them should inform future relevant 
thoughts, emotions, and behaviors into adulthood. However, research investigating this 
hypothesis is only recently developing maturity and reveals somewhat mixed results (Conger 
et al., 2000; Dinero et al., 2009; Miga, Hare, Allen, & Manning, 2010; Fraley et al., 2013; 
Holland, Fraley, & Roisman, 2011; Parade, Supple, & Helms, 2012; Simpson, 1990). Future 
research will have to investigate the specific role of attachment-delineated relationship 
forecasts predicting tangible relationship outcomes. Should convincing links arise indicating 
the predictive validity of relationship forecasts, understanding how these forecasts might 
differentiate by attachment and be subsequently altered – perhaps through attention to 
selected relationship memories – could be of value in developing treatment programs and 
interventions. 
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Figure 1 
Attachment Clusters Demarcated by Participant Locations on Anxiety and Avoidance 
Dimensions 
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Figure 2 
 
Note:     Relationship Dissatisfaction Factor was created from standardized variables.                
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Figure 3 
Note:     Partner Rejection Angst Factor was created from standardized variables.       
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for Attachment Clusters 
Statistic 
Attachment Cluster 
Secure Dismissive Preoccupied 
M (SD) for Anxiety 2.76 (.63) 3.22 (.83) 4.92 (1.18) 
M (SD) for Avoidance 2.15 (.44) 4.19 (.78) 3.07 (.95) 
n  50 40 43 
% of N 37.6% 30.1% 32.3% 
Note:     Participants rated items on 7-point Likert scales. 
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Table 2 
Factor Pattern (and Structure) Coefficients of Positive and Negative Mood 
Note:     Uses principal component analysis with promax rotation. Bold numbers indicate 
item groupings by factor. 
 
 
 
 
 
Item 
Factor 
Item 
Factor 
Negative 
Mood 
Positive 
Mood 
Negative 
Mood 
Positive 
Mood 
Upset .791 (.791) .001 (-.299) Enthusiastic -.047 (-.351) .803 (.821) 
Dissatisfied with 
self 
.747 (.772) -.066 (-.349) Bold .060 (-.244) .803 (.781) 
Afraid .725 (.645) .210 (-.064) Excited .015 (-.286) .795 (.790) 
Angry at self .713 (.721) -.022 (-.291) Energetic -.112 (-.412) .793 (.835) 
Disgusted .710 (.695) .039 (-.229) Joyful -.120 (-.412) .773 (.818) 
Ashamed .704 (.730) -.069 (-.335) Inspired .147 (-.138) .755 (.700) 
Irritable .695 (.673) .057 (-.206) Delighted -.117 (-.395) .733 (.778) 
Angry .690 (.711) -.055 (-.317) Lively -.139 (-.413) .724 (.777) 
Alone .689 (.726) -.097 (-.358) Interested .102 (-.169) .716 (.678) 
Scared .684 (.654) .077 (-.181) Cheerful -.107 (-.377) .713 (.754) 
Downhearted .683 (.732) -.129 (-.388) Alert .233 (-.035) .706 (.618) 
Lonely .670 (.727) -.151 (-.405) Happy -.137 (-.403) .705 (.756) 
Blue .665 (.689) -.065 (-.316) Proud .134 (-.127) .688 (.637) 
Scornful .664 (.603) .163 (-.088) Daring .202 (-.058) .686 (.610) 
Sad .655 (.706) -.135 (-.383) Attentive .058 (-.195) .670 (.648) 
Frightened .651 (.569) .218 (-.028) Strong .043 (-.208) .662 (.646) 
Distressed .643 (.647) -.009 (-.253) Determined .091 (-.150) .636 (.601) 
Nervous .642 (.575) .178 (-.065) Active -.096 (-.335) .631 (.668) 
Blameworthy .640 (.647) -.018 (-.261) Fearless .143 (-.084) .600 (.546) 
Guilty .608 (.592) .044 (-.186) Confident -.243 (-.457) .566 (.658) 
Disgusted with self .591 (.608) -.046 (-.270)    
Shaky .515 (.453) .165 (-.030)    
Loathing .513 (.571) -.151 (-.345)    
Hostile .512 (.553) -.107 (-.301)    
Jittery .469 (.347) .322 (.144)    
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Table 3 
Factor Pattern (and Structure) Coefficients of Forecasted Relationship Qualities 
Note:     Uses principal component analysis with promax rotation. Bold numbers indicate 
item groupings by factor. Participants rated each item/scale while imagining they were in a 
committed romantic relationship five years into the future and one year into the relationship. 
 
 
 
 
Scale / Item 
Factor 
Relationship 
Dissatisfaction  
Partner 
Rejection 
Angst 
Discussion communication -.776 (-.732) .190 (.014) 
Communication avoidance .632 (.658) .115 (.259) 
Aversive communication .669 (.690) .095 (.247) 
Relationship satisfaction -.767 (-.742) .110 (-.064) 
Negativity of partner’s attributed thoughts 
following an argument 
.771 (.789) .077 (.252) 
Negativity of participant’s attributed thoughts 
following an argument 
.697 (.709) .054 (.213) 
Forecasted attachment avoidance .813 (.786) -.121 (.064) 
Likelihood of breakup .649 (.648) -.003 (.144) 
Partner infidelity .601 (.616) .064 (.201) 
Participant infidelity .470 (.461) -.040 (.066) 
Conflict expectations resulting from partner 
wanting to spend an evening by himself/herself 
.313 (.369) .244 (.315) 
Conflict expectation resulting from partner 
leaving participant standing alone at a party 
-.145 (-.005) .615 (.582) 
Distress from partner not responding when 
participant wants to cuddle 
-.055 (.125) .792 (.780) 
Distress from partner not comforting participant 
when participant is feeling down 
-.149 (.019) .738 (.704) 
Distress from partner wanting to spend an 
evening by himself/herself 
.176 (.308) .581 (.621) 
Distress from partner leaving participant standing 
alone at a party 
.013 (.186) .762 (.765) 
Forecasted attachment anxiety .217 (.371) .678 (.727) 
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Table 4 
Unstandardized Regression Coefficients and Zero-order Correlations Predicting Linguistic 
Content Narrative Variables 
  Word Count Positive Word Usage Negative Word Usage 
Predictor 
Unstandardized 
coefficient 
Zero-order 
correlation 
Unstandardized 
coefficient 
Zero-order 
correlation 
Unstandardized 
coefficient 
Zero-order 
correlation 
Main 
effects 
Memory 
Condition 
39.29 .10 -1.86*** -.52*** 1.46*** .55*** 
Secure 
cluster 
3.55 .01 .18 .08 .01 .00 
Dismissive 
cluster 
-27.14 -.09 -.05 .01 .15 .05 
Preoccupied 
cluster 
21.12 .08 -.16 -.09 -.15 -.05 
Interaction 
terms 
Secure X 
condition 
3.77 -.01 .20 -.17 .20 .30*** 
Dismissive 
X condition 
11.74 -.01 -.43 -.26** .02 .27** 
Preoccupied 
X condition 
56.83 .15 .17 -.26** -.25 .16 
Note:     R2 from final model for Word Count = .03. R2 from final model for Positive Word 
Usage = .28. R2 from final model for Negative Word Usage = .31. Regression coefficients 
computed from effect-coded attachment variables and mean-centered condition variables. 
Regression coefficients extracted from first model in which predictor was entered. Zero-order 
correlations computed from dummy-coded attachment variables and mean-centered condition 
variables. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001 
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Table 5 
Unstandardized Regression Coefficients and Zero-order Correlations Predicting Participant 
Ratings of Memory Positivity and Negativity  
  
Participant Ratings of 
Memory Positivity 
Participant Ratings of 
Memory Negativity 
Predictor 
Unstandardized 
coefficient 
Zero-order 
correlation 
Unstandardized 
coefficient 
Zero-order 
correlation 
Main 
effects 
Memory 
Condition 
-4.79*** -.88*** 4.36*** .82*** 
Secure cluster -.06 -.01 -.18 -.06 
Dismissive 
cluster 
.03 -.03 -.14 -.06 
Preoccupied 
cluster 
.04 -.03 .34 .12 
Interaction 
terms 
Secure X 
condition 
-.18 -.44*** -.44 .31*** 
Dismissive X 
condition 
.24 -.33*** .19 .32*** 
Preoccupied 
X condition 
-.01 -.39*** .33 .45*** 
Note:     R2 from final model for Participant Ratings of Memory Positivity = .77. R2 from 
final model for Participant Ratings of Memory Negativity = .69. Regression coefficients 
computed from effect-coded attachment variables and mean-centered condition variables. 
Regression coefficients extracted from first model in which predictor was entered. Zero-order 
correlations computed from dummy-coded attachment variables and mean-centered condition 
variables. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001 
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Table 6 
Means (and Standard Deviations) for Memory Narrative Variables for Full Sample and 
Attachment Clusters in Both Memory Conditions 
Sample 
Positive Memory Condition 
Word 
Count 
Positive 
Emotion 
Words 
Negative 
Emotion 
Words 
Participant 
Ratings of 
Memory 
Positivity 
Participant 
Ratings of 
Memory 
Negativity 
Full Sample 278 (170) 3.89 (1.93) .95 (.88) 6.59 (.98) 1.52 (1.35) 
Secure 312 (238) 3.96 (2.01) .86 (.88) 6.63 (.88) 1.50 (1.56) 
Dismissive 245 (112) 4.04 (1.92) 1.09 (.93) 6.50 (.61) 1.30 (.73) 
Preoccupied 268 (104) 3.63 (1.93) .94 (.88) 6.63 (1.38) 1.68 (1.60) 
Sample 
Negative Memory Condition 
Word 
Count 
Positive 
Emotion 
Words 
Negative 
Emotion 
Words 
Participant 
Ratings of 
Memory 
Positivity 
Participant 
Ratings of 
Memory 
Negativity 
Full Sample 319 (232) 2.02 (1.12) 2.40 (1.29) 1.80 (1.55) 5.90 (1.64) 
Secure 294 (133) 2.30 (1.22) 2.52 (1.45) 1.65 (1.57) 5.50 (1.92) 
Dismissive 296 (149) 1.75 (1.01) 2.57 (1.48) 1.95 (1.61) 5.85 (1.53) 
Preoccupied 364 (346) 1.93 (1.07) 2.15 (.92) 1.83 (1.52) 6.38 (1.31) 
Note:     Participants rated the positivity and negativity of their memories on a 7-point Likert 
scale. 
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Table 7 
Repeated-measures ANOVA Results for Positive and Negative Mood in Positive Memory 
Condition by Sample 
Sample Mood 
Pre-
manipulation 
M (SD) 
Post-
manipulation 
M (SD) 
F 
Wilk’s 
λ 
p 
Partial 
η2 
Total 
Sample (N = 
63) 
Positive 2.95 (.61) 2.72 (.62) 12.29 .835 .001** .165 
Negative 1.60 (.48) 1.61 (.66) .03 1.00 .866 .000 
Secure (N = 
24) 
Positive 2.99 (.71) 2.90 (.64) .96 .960 .338 .040 
Negative 1.47 (.49) 1.34 (.47) 4.91 .824 .037† .176 
Dismissive 
(N = 20) 
Positive 2.88 (.53) 2.62 (.62) 9.63 .664 .006* .336 
Negative 1.58 (.40) 1.63 (.72) .228 .988 .639 .012 
Preoccupied 
(N = 19) 
Positive 2.98 (.57) 2.58 (.57) 5.74 .758 .028* .242 
Negative 1.79 (.49) 1.93 (.67) .89 .953 .357 .047 
Note:     † = p < .10, * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001 after Benjamini-Hochberg 
correction for false discovery rate. Variables discriminate more the closer Wilk’s λ is to zero.  
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Table 8 
Repeated-measures ANOVA Results for Positive and Negative Mood in Negative Memory 
Condition by Sample 
Sample Mood 
Pre-
manipulation 
M (SD) 
Post-
manipulation 
M (SD) 
F 
Wilk’s 
λ 
p 
Partial 
η2 
Total Sample 
(N = 70) 
Positive 3.02 (.68) 2.47 (.93) 66.46 .509 <.001*** .491 
Negative 1.58 (.56) 1.86 (.68) 21.64 .761 <.001*** .239 
Secure (N = 
26) 
Positive 3.28 (.71) 2.72 (1.01) 24.87 .501 <.001*** .499 
Negative 1.44 (.41) 1.69 (.53) 10.50 .704 .003** .296 
Dismissive 
(N = 20) 
Positive 2.72 (.63) 2.31 (.88) 12.43 .605 .002** .395 
Negative 1.50 (.55) 1.65 (.59) 1.59 .923 .223 .077 
Preoccupied 
(N = 24) 
Positive 2.98 (.59) 2.35 (.74) 29.57 .438 <.001*** .562 
Negative 1.79 (.66) 2.22 (.76) 13.16 .636 .001** .364 
Note:     † = p < .10, * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001 after Benjamini-Hochberg 
correction for false discovery rate. Variables discriminate more the closer Wilk’s λ is to zero.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  84 
Table 9 
Unstandardized Regression Coefficients and Zero-order Correlations for Variables 
Predicting Levels of Forecasted Relationship Dissatisfaction and Partner Rejection Angst 
 
 
Relationship Dissatisfaction 
Factor 
Partner Rejection Angst 
Factor 
Predictor 
Unstandardized 
coefficient 
Zero-order 
correlation 
Unstandardized 
coefficient 
Zero-order 
correlation 
Main 
effects 
Memory 
Condition 
-.12 -.08 .05 .05 
Secure cluster -.44*** -.46*** -.33*** -.30** 
Dismissive 
cluster 
.41*** .36*** -.17 -.13 
Preoccupied 
cluster 
.06 .12 .53*** .43*** 
Interaction 
terms 
Secure X 
condition 
.02 .02 .01 -.01 
Dismissive X 
condition 
-.51** -.24** .16 .06 
Preoccupied X 
condition 
.45** .22* -.16 -.05 
Note:     R2 from final model for Relationship Dissatisfaction Factor = .31. R2 from final 
model for Partner Rejection Angst Factor = .20. Regression coefficients computed from 
effect-coded attachment variables and mean-centered condition variables. Regression 
coefficients extracted from first model in which predictor was entered. Zero-order 
correlations computed from dummy-coded attachment variables and mean-centered condition 
variables. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001
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Table 10 
Descriptive Statistics for Forecasts of Relationship Dissatisfaction Factor and Partner 
Rejection Angst Factor for each Attachment Cluster in Both Memory Conditions 
  
Positive Memory 
Condition 
Negative Memory 
Condition 
Cluster Dependent Variable N M (SD) N M (SD) 
Secure 
Relationship 
Dissatisfaction  
23 -.20 (.34) 25 -.30 (.46) 
Partner Rejection 
Angst  
24 .24 (.73) 26 .30 (.82) 
Dismissive 
Relationship 
Dissatisfaction  
19 .93 (1.00) 20 .30 (.52) 
Partner Rejection  
Angst  
20 .33 (.89) 20 .53 (.81) 
Preoccupied 
Relationship 
Dissatisfaction  
19 .14 (.54) 24 .47 (.73) 
Partner Rejection 
Angst  
19 1.19 (.77) 24 1.08 (.69) 
Note:     Relationship Dissatisfaction Factor and Partner Rejection Angst Factor are created 
from standardized variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
